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Abstract
Chapter 1 partially surveys auctions with contingent contracts, i.e., contracts in
which payments are allowed to depend on an ex-post veriﬁable variable, such as
revenues. The review starts with the seminal paper of DeMarzo et al. (2005)
and partially departs from Skrzypacz (2013) by analyzing on externalities and risk
aversion concerns. A partial ranking of auction revenues for auctions that diﬀer in
terms of contract forms, pricing rules and seller commitment are described. Models
incorporating adverse selection, moral hazard, competition between auctioneers,
externalities and risk aversion are discussed.
In Chapter 2 we study second price auctions, where buyers compete for the allo-
cation of a project, by bidding securities over project's realized value. In addition,
we allow for negative externalities, which are suﬀered by the losers in case the win-
ner implements the project. Under this environment, we introduce two payment
instruments: the Fixed-Equity Hybrid -which embeds cash- and the Fixed-Cash
Hybrid -which embeds equity. As our main result, we rank the instruments in terms
of revenue, and show that the ﬁxed-equity hybrid is the best instrument whereas
equity is the worst despite of being the most sensitive instrument to bidders' true
type.
Finally, in Chapter 3 second-price auctions, where buyers compete for the allo-
cation of a project, by bidding securities over project's realized value are studied.
In addition, bidders are allowed to be asymmetric not only with respect to their
underlying distribution of payoﬀs but also with respect to their risk aversion. Un-
der this environment, it is shown that steeper securities provide higher insurance.
As main result, the instruments are ranked in terms of eﬃciency, and shows that
the steepest security minimizes the eﬃciency loss when bidders are indeed asym-
metric. Moreover, steeper securities are shown to increase revenue for the seller as
in DeMarzo et al. (2005).
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Chapter 1
Survey of Auctions with Contingent
Payments
1.1 Introduction
In recent years a ﬂourishment of auctions with contingent payments has taken
place both in practice and in theoretical analysis. Most of these auctions involve
the selling of an asset/contract whose value is at least partially observed. For
example, in oil-leased auctions, if the winner explores the ﬁeld, the government
can measure revenue obtained from the exploration. It is a common practice
around the world for the government selling the rights to drill for oil or natural
gas to collect additional revenue in the form of royalties. Other examples may
include the 3G auction that took place in Hong Kong where bidders submitted
bids on equity.
Auctions with contingent payments refer to cases in which the auctioneer/seller
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allows bidders to compete for the allocation of an asset by means on an auction
where payoﬀs are at least partially tied to the asset realized value. The theoretical
analysis of such auctions has received great attention lately. In this chapter, I
provide a selected survey of literature on this topic to frame the remaining chapters
of the dissertation. I will use DeMarzo et al. (2005) as a focal point henceforth
DKS since it is crucial to understand auctions with contingent payments.
In this survey I depart from Skrzypacz (2013) as it covers real life situations
in which auctions with contingent payments are relevant and focus strictly on the
theoretical analysis. Hence, the review is structured as follows. I ﬁrst describe
the benchmark model of DKS with independent private values and explain why in
such auctions revenue is higher than in cash auctions. Then I discuss the ranking
of auctions with diﬀerent types of contracts if the seller restricts bidders to a
single-dimensional type of contracts. In section 1.3, I review papers that enrich
the benchmark model with important real-life considerations. These features shed
light on some tradeoﬀs that could change the predictions of the basic model. In
sections 1.4 and 1.5, I extend the survey to externalities and risk aversion to provide
a broad picture of the relevant literature to the current dissertation.
This chapter is not a comprehensive survey, however, it provides some exten-
sions to Skrzypacz (2013) by including the role of securities as means of risk sharing
-under the presence of risk averse bidders- and looks at the impact of externalities
on auction design.
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1.2 The Model
The benchmark model with contingent payments follows DKS. There is a seller
and N ex-ante symmetric risk-neutral bidders. Bidders have independent private
values. The seller runs an auction for a project that requires the winner to make
an up-front investment c > 0. If bidder i wins the project, it generates veriﬁ-
able revenue/cashﬂow Zi. Each bidder has private information about his expected
cashﬂow zi. The types zi are distributed independently and symmetrically accord-
ing to some distribution f(zi) over the interval [z, z]. Conditional on zi, bidder i
cashﬂow is distributed according to an atomless distribution h(Zi|zi).
The authors assume h(Zi|zi) has full support and satisﬁes the strict Mono-
tone Likelihood Ratio Property (SMLRP). This assumption implies that a higher
estimate represents a stronger distribution of cashﬂow realizations.
The model considers a bid as a contingent payment oﬀer as a function of the
future cashﬂow, S(Zi). They restrict the attention to bids that satisfy that S(Z)
and S(Z) − Z are increasing and S(Z) > 0, implying the seller cannot subsidize
the bidders. Moreover, S(Z) ≤ Z, representing limited liability on the side of the
bidders. They deﬁne ES(z) ≡ E[S(Z)|z).
On this survey, formal auctions are only addressed. A formal auction is de-
scribed by an ordered set of contracts/securities and an auction format. The set of
allowed contracts S is indexed by s ∈ [s0, s1]. This notation allows us to represent
S(s, Z) as the ex-post payment to the seller of contract with index s if the realized
revenue is Z. Denote ES(s, z) = E[S(s, Zi)|zi = z).
The only requirement the author imposes on ES(s, z) to consider it an order
is that it is increasing on s for every z. In other words, conditional on ﬁxing
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the type, the payment to the seller should be increasing on the index. There are
several types of contracts that ﬁt on this description: cash, royalty/equity, ﬁxed
royalty plus cash bids, ﬁxed contract plus cash bids, debt, allowance plus royalty
contract, royalty contract with a cost deduction and call option.
In an auction the bidder that submitted the highest index wins and pays ac-
cording to the auction format (for example ﬁrst-price or second-price).
Hansen (1985) was the ﬁrst one to consider auctions with contingent contracts
comparing cash to royalty contracts in second-price auctions. He showed that
royalty auctions accrue a higher revenue because the winner is the same but instead
of paying the reservation value of the second highest type now he has to compute
the royalty payment on his distribution, increasing the sensitivity of the payment
to the type of the winner. Riley (1988) showed similar results.
Even though DKS extends Hansen result to a comparison between any security
and cash, their main concern is how to rank diﬀerent securities. For example, does
a royalty contract auction or debt contract auction yields higher revenue? In this
case the slopes of S(Z) are ranked diﬀerently for diﬀerent levels of Z: debt has
a higher slope than equity for low realizations of Z while the opposite ranking is
true for high realizations of Z.
DKS have shown that many standard sets of contracts can be ranked under
the SMLRP assumption. The crucial condition needed to rank diﬀerent securities
is as follows.
Deﬁnition 1 An ordered set of contracts/securities SA is steeper than an ordered
set SB if, for all indices sA and sB from the two sets, ESA(sA, z
∗) = ESB(sB, z∗)
implies that ESA2 (sA, z
∗) > ESB2 (sB, z
∗). If that is true we say that "SA(sA, z)
9
strictly crosses SB(sB, z) from below."
Lemma 2 (Lemma 5 in DKS) If h(Z|z) satisﬁes SMLRP then a suﬃcient con-
dition for SA(sA, z) to strictly cross SB(sB, z) from below is that there exists a Z
∗
such that SA(sA, z) ≤ SB(sB, z) for Z < Z∗ and SA(sA, z) ≥ SB(sB, z) for Z > Z∗.
This lemma implies that equity is steeper than debt and a call option is steeper
than either of them, as seen in Fig. 1.1.
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Figure 1.1: Payoﬀ Diagrams for Call Options, Equity, and Debt.
Proposition 3 (Proposition 1 in DKS) Suppose the ordered set of contracts/securities
SA is steeper than SB. Then for either a ﬁrst-price or a second-price auction, for
any realization of types (almost surely), the seller's revenues are higher using SA
than SB.
As a corollary of this proposition and the previous lemma, debt auctions yield
a lower revenue than royalty/equity and both are dominated by auctions with call
options.
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This result constitutes the main contribution of DKS since it allows to rank in
terms of revenue any security that could be ranked in terms of steepness. Moreover,
they show that this result could be extended to informal auctions, which are beyond
the scope of this review.
1.3 Extensions
DKS main result goes in one direction: Steeper securities are better for the seller
and worse for the bidders. Crémer (1987) makes an even stronger point: if in the
Hansen (1985) environment the seller subsidized most of the up-front cost c, he
would extract arbitrarily close to the full surplus.
The problem is that in practice we observe a rich variety of contracts, ranging
from cash to equity mostly. One plausible explanation has to do with bargaining
power at the time of deciding the payment method. Another alternative could be
risk aversion and the risk sharing allowed by diﬀerent securities. There could also
be externalities or competition among sellers.
Adverse selection: Che and Kim (2010) consider the case in which higher z are
related to higher c. For example a ﬁrm may obtain higher revenues from a project
because they will spend more on marketing. On a second-price auction it is still a
weakly dominant strategy to bid according to your reservation value. In this case
cash is still eﬃcient but securities need not be. Under equity if c(z)/z is increasing
then the winner will be the one with the lowest z.
The adverse selection concern pointed by Che and Kim (2010) could also take
place if c and z are two-dimensional private information of the bidders, which are
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independent across bidders. In this case using securities could lead to an ineﬃcient
allocation of the asset.
Moral hazard: In those cases where the revenue realization depends on the
eﬀort exerted by the winner, using steeper contracts could harm revenue. Using
steeper securities have the beneﬁt that they extract a higher fraction of the revenue
but the main drawback is that they decrease the incentives to exert eﬀort. There
is a tradeoﬀ between extracting surplus and providing incentives. Kogan and
Morgan (2010) consider a model where eﬀort enters multiplicatively while Jun and
Wolfstetter (2014) consider it additively. Both articles highlight that depending
on the cost of eﬀort and the number of bidders is the degree of steepness that
maximizes surplus for the seller.
Even in this case, it could be argued that the relationship between cash and
securities remains: McAfee and McMillan (1986) show that it is possible under
moral hazard to ﬁnd auctions with contingent payments that dominate cash. For
example, asking for a small ﬁxed royalty and letting bidders compete on cash
introduces a second-order loss in terms of eﬃciency, but a ﬁrst-order gain in terms
of surplus, thus dominating pure cash.
Competition between auctioneers: Gorbenko and Malenko (2011) provide a
rationale for using somewhat ﬂat instruments. If there are many sellers and a
ﬁxed pool of bidders then one way in which sellers could attract bidders is by
lowering the steepness, which is similar to a surplus transfer. Their paper is related
to bargaining power since when sellers should compete for bidders the latter get
more power (in relative terms) and force sellers to move away from steep securities.
Budget constraints: Debt contracts induce the same environment as the one
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analyzed by Che and Gale (1998). By imposing a budget constraint bidders bid the
minimum between the budget and the valuation (broadly speaking). The analysis
is not exactly the same because DKS considers securities with limited liability,
which solves the problem for budget constrained bidders.
If bidders have budget constraints then DKS recovers bids in terms of the true
type since bidders will pay with the proceeds of the project. DKS show one way
of moving away from Che and Gale (1998) budget constraint analysis.
Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2005) try to solve the budget constraint issue
by allowing bidders to access a ﬁnancial market. They show that the ﬁnancial
market is not eﬃcient thus the ineﬃciencies of the auction remain.
Bankruptcy: DKS assumes that keeping the type of the winner ﬁxed (and post-
auction actions ﬁxed in case of moral hazard), the overall surplus generated by the
project is independent of the contract. Board (2007) changes this assumption
pointing out that bankruptcy costs are often non-negligible, creating new trade-
oﬀs between division of surplus and surplus creation. He shows that a ﬁrst-price
auction may generate higher revenue for the seller than a second-price auction
when bankruptcy costs are suﬃciently high.
1.4 Externalities
Auctions with externalities have been studied since the seminal papers of Jehiel
et al. (1996, 1999). They use a model of identity-dependent externalities and
solve the optimal mechanism when bidders type is multidimensional bidders have
valuations and identity-dependent externalities, resulting in type vectors with N+1
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entries.
Under the optimal mechanism the seller extracts surplus even from bidders
that do not get the object. They show that if the externalities are suﬃciently high
the seller is better oﬀ by keeping the object for himself even though he gives value
zero to it. Lastly they argue that participation constraints are endogenous. The
intuition is that if a ﬁrm sees that its main competitor in the downstream market
is participating in an auction for a patent, it may have incentives to participate as
well because by not doing so its market share could be severely reduced.
Securities pose a higher threat to revenue under negative externalities. When
bidders compete on the downstream market they may go to the auction to prevent
his competitors from getting the asset. This protective strategy is easier to be
carried out with securities since no implementation leads to no payment. The
second chapter of the dissertation tries to understand the implications of negative
externalities when bidding with securities.
Positive externalities have a free rider problem since bidders may be better oﬀ
not participating in the auction but enjoying the externalities. Even though this
setup is diﬃcult to motivate it is worth being considered.
1.5 Risk Aversion
Abhishek et al. (2015) is the ﬁrst paper that introduces risk aversion to DKS
environment. They have risk averse bidders although their utility functions are
the same bidders are homogeneous in terms of their utility functions. This setup is
closer to reality because bidders may be competing for a technology whose returns
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are unknown, involving risk. When bidders are risk averse then securities provide
a channel to share risk. For example, equity allows bidders to pay less under
low realizations and more when realizations are high, representing some kind of
insurance.
The authors focus on revenue and show that DKS order prevails with homo-
geneous risk averse bidders as long as the SMLRP holds. Moreover, they show
that relaxing the signals ordering to FOSD breaks the revenue ordering. Lastly,
they characterize Strong Steepness which is the condition needed to recover DKS
ranking under FOSD.
Another possible case where risk aversion becomes relevant is the one of het-
erogeneous bidders in terms of the utility function. In this case the insurance plays
an asymmetric role since the more risk averse beneﬁt the most out of it. The third
chapter of the dissertation tries to understand the implications of heterogeneous
risk aversion when bidding with securities.
1.6 Concluding Remarks
In recent years auctions with contingent payments have increased their popularity.
Researchers started developing models to understand the extent of the practice
pros and cons. Since no solution ﬁts all, many papers have been written after the
benchmark model proposed by DKS.
This survey reviews the benchmark model and some of the modiﬁcations that
were proposed afterwards, dealing with adverse selection, moral hazard, competi-
tion between auctioneers, budget constraints, externalities and risk aversion. The
15
last two topics will be extended on this dissertation.
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Chapter 2
Bidding Securities in Projects with
Externalities
2.1 Introduction
Over the last two decades, the sector of technological ﬁrms have witnessed a ﬂour-
ishment without precedence, boosted among others, by the presence of internet
and a robust market of patents. The role of this market has been twofold. From
one hand, it has allowed companies to monetize their inventions by auctioning
them to a pool of interested ﬁrms, but at the same time has permitted the same
companies to acquire patents to develop their own products. Such environment has
made possible for start-up companies -unlike in any other market- to evolve into
strong competitors, with a large market capitalization, in short time. Remarkable
examples include Uber -which reached a capitalization of $41 billion in less than
20
six years, the fastest in history- WhatsApp and Spnapchat.1
Therefore, if a competitor acquires the right portfolio of patents, an operating
ﬁrm in a speciﬁc niche might promptly see its market share reduced, because it
would enable the competitor to develop its own innovation. For this reason, many
large ﬁrms acquire patents as a protective strategy: to preclude the development
of nascent companies that may change the status quo of its market participation.
Examples here include Facebook, Yahoo and Microsoft.2 In addition, Hall and
Ziedonis (2001) ﬁnd that after 1982, the US semiconductor ﬁrms started patent
portfolio races, not to appropriate R&D revenue, but to prevent other ﬁrms from
getting these patents.
This scenario raises many interesting questions. First, if a start-up is selling
its project -or innovation- through a standard second price auction and wants to
maximize revenue, we could ask what the optimal method of payment is. Should
the seller conduct the auction in cash, or should he use a security, contingent
on project's return? This dichotomy has relevance, because if the innovation is
allotted to a ﬁrm that intends not to implement the project, the seller would
receive a payoﬀ of zero if he uses a security. On the other hand, if the project
only has value for the winner when he implements it, the seller might be better oﬀ
using a contingent payment as it is more sensitive to bidder's true valuation (c.f.
DeMarzo, Kremer and Skrzypacz, 2005).
A related question is how bidders' optimal strategies behave under the presence
of a negative externality, given the method of payment. Here, the key observation
1For more details see http://www.wsj.com/articles/uber and
http://www.wsj.com/articles/snapchat.
2Recently Facebook acquired a portfolio of 750 patents to defend itself from a lawsuit from
Yahoo and other companies. See http://techcrunch.com/2012/03/23/facebook
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is that the presence of a negative externality increases the eagerness of the bidders
to win the auction, even when they attach a very low valuation to the project.
To answer these questions, we build a model where the seller sells the rights of
a project through a standard second price auction, but where he can utilize two
hybrids as methods of payment: (i) a ﬁxed-equity hybrid where the seller ﬁxes the
fraction of equity requested, and let bidders compete in cash, and (ii) a ﬁxed-cash
hybrid, where the seller ﬁxes the amount of cash the winner has to pay, and let
bidders compete in equity. Notice that the former embeds pure cash whereas the
latter embeds pure equity.
The reason for which including a ﬁxed payment in the instruments may be
beneﬁcial for the seller, resides in the problem of adverse selection associated with
the incentives of a buyer to participate in the auction. Speciﬁcally, a buyer may
want to participate in the auction either to try to implement the project (because
it is proﬁtable to do so), or just to attempt to block the allocation of his rival. If
the seller is paid upon the implementation of the project, allocating it to a buyer
of the second class (i.e. the bad type) would be detrimental for his revenue.
In the absence of a ﬁxed payment, the bad type have always an incentive to
participate in the auction to try to destroy the equilibrium where the project is
implemented. Thus, the ﬁxed payment acts as a screening device among bidders.
However, the seller faces a clear trade-oﬀ in his aim, because introducing a ﬁxed
payment decreases the proﬁtability of the project for all buyers, which in turn
leads to a lower probability of implementation. The goal of the present chapter
is to determine the optimal ﬁxed payment for both hybrids, and rank them with
respect to seller's expected revenue.
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Certainly, our article is not the ﬁrst interested in exploring the relation between
revenue and the method of payment used in an auction. In fact, De Marzo, Kremer
and Skrzypacz (2005) has shown that if there are no externalities, the methods of
payment can be ranked in revenue by their steepness, or the sensitivity of bidder's
true type to the instrument utilized. An insight ﬁrst hinted by Hansen (1985)
and Riley (1988). They also show that the auction format has only an impact
on revenue by its ability of modifying the steepness of the particular instrument
utilized. Nonetheless, to arrive to their conclusions it is crucial that bidders operate
in an environment free of negative externalities. When we incorporate them into
the model, their main result does not hold anymore, precisely because a winner of
the auction may acquire the project not to implement it.
In order to isolate the eﬀect produced by the interaction of the externalities
with the method of payment, we focus on a simple model of two bidders, where the
loser of the auction suﬀers a commonly known negative externality if the winner
implements the project.3 This framework arises naturally in industries where
bidding ﬁrms are similar ex-ante, and the project gives a comparative advantage
in the downstream market to the winner. Surprisingly, many of the insights can
be captured with this simple version. First, we consider a simple model where
both, externalities and valuations are public information. Even in this simple
framework the characterization of equilibria is not trivial, because it depends on
the interaction of the externality, the cost of the project and bidder's own valuation.
Our main result, stated in theorem 6, shows that under some mild technical
conditions, the following is satisﬁed. First, the optimal ﬁxed-equity requires a
3One important clariﬁcation is that we use the word implementation, because if an agent wins
the object but does not implement it, no agent suﬀer any externality.
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strictly positive equity payment, and the optimal ﬁxed-cash hybrid involves a
strictly positive payment in cash. Second, the optimal ﬁxed-equity hybrid is the
instrument that yields the highest expected revenue, followed by cash, which in
turn is followed by the optimal ﬁxed-cash hybrid. Equity is the worst instrument
in the menu, despite of being the steepest.
The intuition of the latter results lies in the fact that with equity, a bidder will
pay zero if he does not implement the project, but his bid will aﬀect the proﬁtability
of implementing the project for his opponent. In that sense, a particular buyer
can eﬀectively use the threatening-power equity equips bidders with, to destroy the
equilibria when the other buyer ﬁnds proﬁtable to implement the project. When
the seller uses cash as the instrument, this problem is mitigated by the fact that
all payments are made upfront, rather than conditional on the implementation of
the project. Therefore, the optimal instrument for the seller would be one that
simultaneously features the screening beneﬁts oﬀered by cash, and the ability of
equity to extract surplus. This design is precisely at the heart of the ﬁxed equity
hybrid. On the other hand, when the seller sets the ﬁxed payment in terms of
cash, and let buyers use equity to screen themselves, buyers conserve part of their
power to block the implementation of the project, and so the adverse selection
motive dominates. Surprisingly, this eﬀect is so powerful that the optimal ﬁxed-
cash hybrid performs worse than cash for a suﬃciently low implementation cost
and a suﬃciently high negative externality.
The ranking of the instruments is robust to the structure of information, as
it is preserved for a large class of log concave distributions over private buyers'
valuation. In particular, equity continues to deliver zero revenue despite of being
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the steepest instrument in the menu. Even though, we cannot deliver a general
theorem as in the case of public information, we obtain very similar results via a
simulation.
Finally, in a comparative statics exercise, theorem 7 ﬁnds that the ﬁxed por-
tion of both instruments is weakly increasing with respect to an improvement in
the distributions, in the sense implied by the Monotone Likelihood Ratio (MLR)
property. This result is clearly intuitive: as the probability of drawing higher
valuation increases, the seller is less concerned of inducing participation, and can
commit himself to extract a higher portion of revenue before the competition in
the auction takes place.
Related Literature Our article is related to the literature of auctions with
securities and to the literature of auctions with externalities. Nonetheless, as
far as we know this is the ﬁrst article connecting both strands of literature, to
analyze how the interaction of negative externalities and securities impact bidding
strategies and seller's expected revenue. Moreover, as we discussed before, due to
the implementability incentives of buyers, our model can also be framed in the
literature of auctions under adverse selection.
The literature of auctions with securities started with the seminal articles of
Hansen (1985) and Riley (1988), who basically showed that a second price auc-
tion run in equity yields higher expected revenue to the seller than one run in
cash. More recently, De Marzo, Kremer and Skrzypacz (2005) -hereafter DKS-
generalize this framework by providing a methodology to rank securities with re-
spect to revenue. Speciﬁcally, they characterize the steepness or sensitivity of
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several instruments via a single crossing property argument, and show that steeper
instruments yield a higher revenue for the seller. Furthermore, they argue that
the auction format is only relevant as long as it modiﬁes the steepness of the in-
strument utilized.4 Although DKS analyze a larger class of securities than what
we do in this article, the main essence of their analysis is retained, because the
distinction of the payment condition (i.e. contingent vs non-contingent) is the
key ingredient to obtain our main result. As mentioned before, we focus in two
hybrid instruments that are used in practice, and which include cash and equity
as particular cases.5
Following endeavors to DKS include Gorbenko and Malenko (2011) and Che
(2010). The former analyzes the predictions of a DKS model when the set of
bidders is ﬁnite and many sellers compete for them. Their main result shows that
sellers will not use the steepest instrument because they would not attract enough
bidders. We also obtain the same result but for diﬀerent reasons. In our case, using
a pure security is detrimental for seller's revenue because it allows buyers, who do
not intend to implement the project, to destroy the equilibria where good-type
buyers would have implemented it otherwise.
Meanwhile, Che and Kim (2010) modify DKS framework by assuming that
buyers with higher valuations also have a higher cost to implement the project.
This simple modiﬁcation leads to an adverse selection problem when the seller
uses a security, because buyers with high valuation would bid a lower amount, and
4In particular, they prove that when the seller uses securities the Revenue Equivalence The-
orem may not hold.
5Our ﬁxed-equity hybrid resembles the way writers sell the rights of their books because there
is a ﬁxed royalty rate and publishers compete on cash. On the other side our ﬁxed-cash hybrid
captures the main feature of the oil rights auction in Mexico where buyers pay a ﬁxed amount
and compete on equity.
26
therefore, more often such buyers will win the auction. As the revenue of the seller
is tied to bidders' true type when he uses a security, this adverse selection problem
cause the revenue to decrease. We found that using securities when externalities
are present can lead to the same result. Here, the low-valuation buyers would bid
more aggressively because they want to avoid the negative externality, and can
block implementation at no cost when the seller uses pure securities. Nonetheless,
whereas Che and Kim (2010) makes assumptions on the cost structure of the
model, we make assumptions on the after-market behavior of ﬁrms, which we
consider more signiﬁcant in many patent auctions where securities are normally
utilized.
Our article also contributes -in minor extent- to the literature of auctions with
externalities, initiated by Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti (1996, 1999). However,
rather than proposing an optimal mechanism exercise under an environment with
externalities, we analyze a small but widely used class of instruments, which unlike
Jehiel et al. also incorporates securities as a method of payment. We are able to
show that under negative externalities, a second price auction in cash is no longer
an optimal mechanism, because in our model we ﬁnd that the best instrument is
a ﬁxed-equity hybrid.
Organization of the chapter The rest of the chapter is structured as follows.
Section 2.2 states the environment of the model. In section 2.3 we introduce the
case of complete information, derive the equilibrium bidding strategies, and rank
the instruments with respect to revenue. Section 2.4 presents a robustness exercise
for the case of private information. Section 2.5 concludes. Some of the proofs are
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relegated to the appendix.
2.2 The Environment
A seller is interested in allocating an indivisible asset -which can be thought as
the rights of a project or innovation- among two diﬀerent buyers. The winner
is required to pay a cost of c > 0 in order to implement the project, which is
considered as the initial investment to run the project, and is commonly known.
We index buyers by i = 1, 2 whereas the seller is designated as player i = 0. Buyer
i's valuation vi is drawn identically and independently from [v, v¯], according to the
distribution F which corresponding non-atomic density f .
If the project is implemented by a competitor, buyer i suﬀers a negative ex-
ternality of e ∈ [e¯, 0], which we assume is symmetric and publicly known among
buyers. One important aspect of our model is that externalities are contingent
to the implementation of the allotted buyer. Second, private valuation refers to
the gross return of the project, and so a rational winner i will only implement it
if vi − c > 0. Third, even if a buyer does not want to implement the project it
would be beneﬁcial for him to acquire it to preclude the implementation by other
competitors, and thus avoiding the potential negative externality he might suﬀer.
The seller commits to use a second price auction to sell the project, but we
assume he can utilize two diﬀerent instruments: a ﬁxed-equity hybrid and a ﬁxed-
cash hybrid. In the former the seller ﬁxes the equity over project's return requested
from the winner, and let bidders to compete in cash. The winner is the buyer who
submits the highest bid in cash but pays the bid of his opponent. Clearly, a
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standard second price auction with cash corresponds to the case when the seller
request zero equity. On the other hand, when the seller uses a ﬁxed-cash hybrid,
he ﬁxes an amount in cash the winner of the auction has to pay, and let buyers to
compete in equity. As before, the winner of the auction is the buyer who submits
the highest equity bid, but pays the lowest bid. In this case, when the seller asks
a ﬁxed cash of zero, the auction is conducted in pure equity.
All players are risk neutral, and buyers' utility is additively separable. Let zi
be the return buyer i derives from the project after his implementation decision.
That is, zi = vi − c if he implements the project and zero otherwise. Thus, if
buyer i, with type vi, wins the auction his payoﬀ is given by zi− ti(vi), where ti(vi)
represents the payment to the seller, which potentially depends on his valuation.
On the other hand, if the seller allocates the object to buyer j, then buyer i's
payoﬀ corresponds to e, provided his competitor implements the project; and zero
otherwise. The value of the project for the seller is zero, and hence in any trade
with buyer i his utility is ti(vi).
6 If no trade occurs, the payoﬀ is zero for all
players.
Figure 2.1 depicts the timing of the game. First, seller chooses a payment
instrument and commits to run a second price auction under this format. Then,
buyers learn their valuations and submit their bids to the seller, who determines
the winner of the auction. Next, the winner determines if he wants to implement
or not the project. Finally, payoﬀs are realized contingent on the implementation
decision.
6Think for example in a seller who owns a patent over a speciﬁc productive process that by
itself cannot be monetized, but can potentially enhance the productivity of the current technology
held by the buyers.
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Seller
chooses an
instrument
Buyers
learn their
valuations
Bids are
submitted
Winner
decides upon
implementation
Payoﬀs
are
realized
Figure 2.1: Timing of the auction
2.3 Public Buyer's Valuation
In this section we assume that before participating in the auction, each buyer
learns his own valuation as well as the valuation of his opponent. Without loss
of generality we will assume v1 > v2. The seller, on the other hand, only knows
the distribution where buyers' valuations come from. Nonetheless, the negative
externality is public information for all players. This setting plausibly corresponds
to a situation where both buyers have been operating in a market for long time
and have learned the technology of each opponent, but where a seller is an outsider
of the industry who has developed an innovation that can enhance the technology
of both buyers, but cannot evaluate to which extent.
The seller wants to maximize the ex-ante revenue and for that purpose has
to choose which instrument to utilize. Once the seller chooses an instrument he
commits to it. Thus, bidders are engaged in a game of public information, where
they have to choose their bid bi in the correspondent security space. In the case
of the ﬁxed-equity hybrid bi ∈ R+, whereas in the case of the ﬁxed-cash hybrid
bi ∈ [0, 1].
A Motivating Example In this section we will go through an easy example
that will highlight the main results of the chapter.
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A. No Externalties Consider an auction in which two buyers, Alice and Bob,
compete for a project. The project requires an initial ﬁxed investment of c > 0
which can be interpreted as the minimum up-front cash payment required by
the seller. Alice expects that if she undertakes the project, it would yield her a
return of va, whereas Bob expects a cash ﬂow of vb. Without loss of generality,
c < vb < va. We assume that both valuations are common knowledge to both
buyers. As the seller commits to use a second price auction, the weakly dominant
strategy for both buyers is to bid their reservation value. As a result, Alice would
bid ba(va) = va − c and Bob would bid bb(vb) = vb − c. Hence, Alice wins the
auction and pays Bob's bid, which implies seller's revenue would be Πca = vb − c.
Now, suppose that rather than bidding with cash, the buyers compete by of-
fering equity over the return of the project. As we discuss later, in this case it is
also a weakly dominant strategy for both buyers to bid their reservation value. 7
Thus, Alice would make aa equity bid of ba(va) =
va−c
va
, whereas Bob would make
an equity bid of bb(vb) =
vb−c
vb
. As a result, Alice wins the auction and pays ac-
cording to Bob's bid. Seller's revenue would be Πeq = vb−c
vb
va. By an easy algebraic
manipulation, it is possible to see that sellers revenue under equity is higher than
under cash, as
Πeq =
vb − c
vb
va = (vb − c)va
vb
> vb − c = Πca
B. Externalities Consider the same auction as before but now with the modi-
ﬁcation that if buyer i wins the auction and implements the project, the payoﬀ of
7The reservation value of buyer i is when his payoﬀ equals 0: (1 − bi(vi))vi − c = 0 thus
bi(vi) =
vi−c
vi
.
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buyer −i will be e < 0.
Cash. When the payment instrument is cash, bidding the reservation value
continue to be a weakly dominant strategy for both buyers. Nonetheless, it now
should include the externality. Thus, ba(va) = va − c − e and bb(vb) = vb − c − e.
Seller's revenue becomes Πca = vb − c− e.
Equity. If buyers compete by oﬀering equity the analysis is more interesting.
Here, Alice knows that if she bids ba(va) =
va−c
va
then Bob has no incentives to
implement the project in case he wins, because (1− va−c
va
)vb− c < 0.8 This implies
that Alice will be willing to make the same oﬀer as without externalities. For Bob,
the incentives in the auction change. On one hand, he can bid his reservation
value, lose the auction, let Alice implement the project, and obtain a payoﬀ of
e < 0. On the other hand, he can bid higher than Alice, win the auction, shut
down the project, and obtain a payoﬀ of 0. By comparing both scenarios, it is
clear that Bob's optimal strategy is to bid anything on the interval (ba(va), 1] and
secure for himself a payoﬀ of 0. Seller's revenue becomes Πeq = 0 in this case.
Fixed-Equity and Fixed-Cash. To conclude the example we will provide
a rationale for introducing a ﬁxed-equity and a ﬁxed-cash hybrid as methods of
payment. By deﬁnition, the revenue collected by both instruments depends on the
selection of the ﬁxed component. The challenge for the seller resides in choosing
such ﬁxed components when he only knows the distribution of valuations. For
instance, if the seller sets a very high ﬁxed equity α¯, buyers may lose the incentive
to participate in the auction. Likewise, if he sets a very low ﬁxed cash b¯, he would
not be extracting as much surplus as possible from the winner.
8As (1− va−cva )va − c = 0 and vb < va.
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The following table shows the values of α¯∗, Πfe, b¯∗, Πfc, Πca and Πeq for diﬀerent
distributions of types when the cost of implementing the project is c = 0.1 and
the externality is e = −0.2.
Table 2.1: Seller expected revenue under optimal securities: Public Info
Expected Seller Revenue
Distribution α¯∗ b¯∗ Πfe(α¯∗) Πca Πfc(b¯∗) Πeq
U [0, 1] 0.51 0.53 0.56 0.44 0.32 0
B[2, 2] 0.49 0.43 0.57 0.47 0.3 0
B[2, 7] 0.1 0.16 0.24 0.23 0.09 0
IB[2, 7]9 0.73 0.63 0.90 0.80 0.56 0
By looking at the distributions and the revenues some facts can be highlighted:
• When comparing symmetric distributions α¯∗, b¯∗, Πfe(α¯∗), Πca, and Πfc(b¯∗)
are very similar.
• When the relative likelihood of high types to low types increases, α¯∗, b¯∗,
Πfe(α¯∗), Πca, and Πfc(b¯∗) increase as well.
• Given c = 0.1 and e = −0.2 the rank of the instruments with respect to
revenue is as follows Πfe(α¯∗) > Πca > Πfc(b¯∗) > Πeq.
In the succeeding section we will formally introduce the instruments, charac-
terize the equilibrium bidding strategies, and obtain seller's expected revenue.
9The Inverse-Beta distribution is computed from a former Beta distribution. If f(x) represents
the PDF of a Beta then the PDF of an Inverse-Beta would be g(y) = f(−x + 1). If the former
Beta distribution had a right tail then the Inverse-Beta associated to it will have a left tail.
When the former Beta is symmetric then the Inverse-Beta is exactly the same.
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2.3.1 Fixed-Equity Hybrid
In the ﬁxed-equity hybrid, seller ﬁxes the equity α¯ the winner of the auction has
to pay over the return of the project. Knowing this information buyers compete in
cash for the allocation of the project. Thus, winner's payment to the seller consists
of the lowest bid in cash, plus the ﬁxed-equity fraction over projects' return.
Proposition 4 The dominant-strategy equilibrium of the second price auction un-
der a ﬁxed-equity hybrid is characterized as follows:
i) If (1− α¯)v1 − c < 0, then b1 = b2 = 0.
ii) If (1 − α¯)v1 − c > 0 and (1 − α¯)v2 − c < 0, then b1 = (1 − α¯)v1 − c and
b2 = −e.
iii) If (1− α¯)v2 − c ≥ 0, then b1 = (1− α¯)v1 − c− e and b2 = (1− α¯)v2 − c− e.
Proof. In case i) the project is not proﬁtable to implement for any of the buyers,
and thus, their best strategy is to submit a bid of zero. On the other hand, in case
ii) the project is proﬁtable to implement for buyer 1 but not for buyer 2; hence,
the best strategy for buyer 1 is to bid his reservation value, and implement the
project if he is allocated. Given buyer 1's strategy, the best response of buyer 2 is
to bid his reservation value, which in this case is the negative externality he knows
will suﬀer if buyer 1 wins the auction. Finally, if the project is proﬁtable for both
bidders, both will bid their reservation value, which includes the avoidance of the
externality.
There are several interesting observations that can be highlighted from propo-
sition 4. First, the likelihood of allocations and payments are not necessarily
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weakly increasing in buyer's type. For instance, if buyer 2 -the one with the lowest
valuation- bids the absolute value of the externality, wins the auction, and pays
the reservation value of buyer 1. Moreover, if both buyers ﬁnd proﬁtable to im-
plement the project, there cannot be an equilibrium in which buyer 2 implements
the project, and therefore, his incentives to participate in the auction reside in
avoiding the externality if he can win the auction at a price lower than the value
of the externality e.
Figure 2.2 shows the bidding strategy of bidder 1 as a function of the valuation
of bidder 2, given that v1 >
c
1−α¯ , and thus when only cases ii) and iii) are possible.
10
v2
b1(v2)
10 c
1−α¯
b′1(v2)
b′′1(v2)
−e
(1− α¯)(v′′1 − v′1)
Figure 2.2: Bidding strategies with ﬁxed-equity for buyer 1
It can be observed from ﬁgure 2.2 that as soon as the project becomes proﬁtable
for buyer 2 (i.e. when v2 ≥ c1−α) buyer 1 increases his bid by −e, to reﬂect the
fact that he would suﬀer the externality in case he loses the auction.
The expected revenue generated by the ﬁxed-equity hybrid under these equi-
librium strategies correspond to
10If v1 <
c
1−α¯ then he will bid b1(v1) = 0 when v2 <
c
1−α¯ , otherwise b1(v1) = −e.
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Πfe(α¯) = 2F (
c
1− α¯)
∫ c−e
1−α¯
c
1−α¯
((1− α¯)v1 − c)f(v1)dv1 (2.1)
+ 2F (
c
1− α¯)
∫ v¯
c−e
1−α¯
(α¯v1 − e)f(v1)dv1
+
∫ v¯
c
1−α¯
∫ v¯
c
1−α¯
[(1− α¯) min{v1, v2} − c− e+ α¯max{v1, v2}]f(v1)f(v2)dv1dv2
First, notice that if the project is not proﬁtable for any buyer, the auction will
generate zero revenue. In the case it is proﬁtable for buyer 1 but not for buyer
2, we need to identify two sub-cases: one when 0 < (1 − α¯)v1 − c < −e, and the
other one when −e < (1 − α¯)v1 − c. In the former, buyer 2 wins the auction but
does not implement the project, therefore the seller does not collect revenue from
the equity portion of the hybrid, but will get a transfer of (1 − α¯)v1 − c, which
is the lowest bid in cash. This case corresponds to the ﬁrst term in equation (1).
Now, in the other case, buyer 1 will win and implement the project, which means
the seller will collect a contingent revenue of α¯v1 plus a transfer in cash of −e.
This corresponds to the second term. Finally, when both buyers ﬁnd proﬁtable
to implement the project, the seller collects the lowest reservation value in cash,
plus the fraction of equity corresponding to the highest type. This is precisely the
third term.
2.3.2 Fixed-Cash Hybrid
When the seller uses a ﬁxed-cash hybrid he ﬁxes the amount in cash the winner
of the auction has to pay, b¯. Knowing this information, bidders compete in equity
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for the allocation of the project, and it is allocated to the buyer with the highest
bid in equity. Therefore, winner's ﬁnal payment to the seller corresponds to the
lowest bid in equity, times the return of the project when it is implemented by
him, plus the ﬁxed-amount in cash.
Proposition 5 The Nash Equilibrium of the second price auction under a ﬁxed-
cash hybrid is characterized as follows:
i) If v1 − c− b¯ < 0; then b1 = b2 = 0.
ii,a) If v1 − c− b¯ > 0 and −b¯ ≤ e; then b1 = v1−c−b¯v1 and b2 = 0.
ii,b) If v1 − c− b¯ > 0 and −b¯ > e; then b1 = v1−c−b¯v1 and b2 = (v1−c−b¯v1 , 1].
Proof. In the ﬁrst case the project is not proﬁtable for any of the buyers and then
no one will suﬀer the externality in case the project is allocated to his opponent.
Moreover, bidding a positive equity will give the buyers a positive probability of
winning the auction, which will force them to pay the amount b¯ to the seller.
Therefore, the best strategy for both buyers is to stay out of the auction. If the
project is proﬁtable for buyer 1 but not for buyer 2, and the ﬁxed amount of cash
b¯ is higher or equal to the value of avoiding the externality −e, buyer 2 prefers to
stay out of the auction and suﬀer the externality. On the other hand, if −b¯ > e,
buyer 2 has an incentive to participate in the auction to bid high enough in order
to destroy the incentives of buyer 1 to implement the project in case he wins
the auction. In both cases, the best response of buyer 1 is to bid his reservation
value, which does not take into account the avoidance of the externality, because
he knows buyer 2 never will implement the project if he has the opportunity to do
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so. Finally if the project is proﬁtable for both, there is no equilibrium in which
buyer 2 wins the auction and implements the project. The reason is that as the
reservation value of buyer 2 is lower than the one of buyer 1, if buyer 1 is not the
winner then there is a proﬁtable deviation in which he oﬀers a slightly higher bid
than buyer 2, wins the auction, and avoid the negative externality. Given that
situation, the best response for buyer 2 is to bid 0 if −b¯ ≤ e, or otherwise bid high
enough to destroy the incentive of buyer 1 to implement the project in case he
wins the project. Following the strategy of buyer 2, the best strategy for buyer 1
is to submit his reservation value.
Equity represents the particular case in which b¯ = 0. In this case implementa-
tion never takes place and blocking is always the best response of the weak buyer.
Notice that this is true for any e < 0 and moreover this is one of the possible
equilibrium for e = 0, being this equilibrium particularly robust.
In ﬁgure 2.3 we present the bidding strategy of bidder 1 as a function of the
valuation of bidder 2, given that it is proﬁtable for him to implement (i.e. when
v1 > c+ b¯). In other words, we restrict attention to cases ii,a) and ii,b.
11
Figure 2.3 shows that as v1 increases b1(v1, ·) increases as well (v′′1 > v′1), which
implies that the region of parameters under which buyer 1 just block the allocation
decreases.12
The revenue generated by these equilibrium strategies corresponds to
Πfc(b¯) = (1− F (c+ b¯)2)b¯ (2.2)
11If v1 < c + b¯ then he will bid b1(v1) = 0 when v2 < c + b¯ or b¯ > −e, otherwise he will bid
anything between 1 and the reservation value of buyer 2.
12Under v′1 he will block the allocation at the dashed plus dotted region whereas under v
′′
1 he
will block only at the dotted region.
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Figure 2.3: Bidding strategies with ﬁxed-cash for buyer 1
It states that the seller will collect the ﬁxed amount of cash b¯ as long as at
least one of the buyers ﬁnd proﬁtable to implement the project. The clear tradeoﬀ
for the seller is that increasing b¯ diminishes the probability of implementation, but
increases the surplus extracted conditional on implementation.
Once we considered the expected revenues of both instruments given by ex-
pressions (2.1) and (2.2), the natural following step is to determine how do they
rank. This is precisely the matter of the following theorem.
Theorem 6 For any log-concave density f , there exists a cutoﬀ values c¯ and e,
such that if c ∈ (0, c¯) and e < e the instruments can be ranked in expected revenue
as follows:
Πfe(α¯∗) > Πfe(0) > Πfc(b¯∗) > Πfc(0) (2.3)
Theorem 6 states that if the cost of the project and the negative externality
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are suﬃciently low, the seller is globally better oﬀ using a ﬁxed-equity hybrid.
The reason of this result is that, as we discussed before, when payments are made
upfront in cash buyers have to face a sunk cost if they want to block the imple-
mentation of his opponent. Therefore, the willingness of a bad type to pay is
bounded above by the absolute value of the negative externality. If the externality
is so large that the bad type wins the auction, the seller secures for himself the
reservation value of the highest type; otherwise, he receives the ﬁxed equity from
the good type, plus the value of the externality in cash. On the other hand, when
buyers can bid in equity they can destroy more often the equilibrium in which the
project is implemented. The eﬀect is particularly dramatic when the seller uses a
pure security, because blocking can be done at no cost. This problem can be mit-
igated by incorporating a ﬁxed cash component b¯; however as the theorem shows,
its presence is not suﬃcient to oﬀset the perverse incentives of the bad type
buyers. The result holds for any log concave density, which suggests that the in-
teraction between buyers is strong enough to hold under diﬀerent distributional
assumptions.
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Figure 2.4: Revenue as a function of α¯ and b¯ for U [0, 1]
Figure 2.4 illustrates the result of theorem 6 when valuations are drawn inde-
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pendently and identically from a uniform distribution with support [0, 1], with a
negative externality of e = −0.2 and a cost of c = 0.1. As it can be seen, there is a
large range for the parameter α¯ such that the ﬁxed-equity hybrid renders a higher
revenue than cash, which in turn yields a higher revenue than the ﬁxed-cash hy-
brid. Noticeably, the revenue obtained by cash is 50% higher than the one yielded
by the optimal ﬁxed-cash hybrid.13
Monotone Comparative Statics Now we will inspect what happens to the
optimal ﬁxed parameters b¯∗ and α¯∗ when the distribution improves in the sense of
the Monotone Likelihood Ratio property. This analysis will provide an insight of
how diﬀerent distributions aﬀect the design of both hybrids
Theorem 7 Suppose f1 dominates f0 in the Monotone Likelihood Ratio (MLR),
then b¯∗1 ≥ b¯∗0. If additionally, F1(y)F0(y) >
f1(y)
f0(y)
for all y ∈ [c, v¯], then α¯∗1 ≥ α¯∗1
Proof. See the appendix.
Theorem 7 says that for a ﬁxed cost and an externality, if the likelihood of
getting higher values improve in the sense of MLR, the optimal ﬁxed cash amount
in its respective hybrid cannot decrease. If in addition the ratio of the densities is
majorized by the ratio of the distributions for all values greater than the cost, the
optimal ﬁxed equity portion in its respective hybrid cannot decrease. It implies
that when the seller is using the ﬁxed-equity hybrid he will apply a higher equity
portion over a higher expected return of the project. Likewise, when the seller
uses a ﬁxed-cash hybrid, it means that now the barrier a bad type has to surpass
13Similar ﬁgures for diﬀerent distributions are presented in the appendix.
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to enter the auction and block implementation is higher. Naturally, in both cases
expected seller's revenue increases.
2.3.3 Other Variations
Deposit Insurance Notice that depending on the security design, the seller
can collect a payment from buyers in two stages: after a buyer wins the auction,
and after a winner implements the project. As mentioned before, the idea of
introducing a payment in cash was a device to screen the low type buyers who
otherwise would always have an incentive to enter into the auction to destroy the
implementation incentives of the high type buyers. In particular, the ﬁxed-cash
hybrid forces the winner to make a payment in cash right after winning the auction.
A variant of this instrument, is to introduce a cash deposit (or insurance). This
device would work as follows. The seller ﬁxes an amount each buyer has to deposit
to participate in the auction. Then, a second price auction in equity is run. The
loser gets the deposit back. If the winner implements the project, he has to pay
the correspondent equity over project's return but the seller gives back the cash
deposit. On the other hand, if the winner does not implement the project the seller
retains the cash deposit.14 Although the cash transfer is determined in a diﬀerent
stage, it can be shown that bidding strategies are the same as in the ﬁxed-cash
hybrid, and therefore the revenue for the seller does not change. In other words:
If the cash deposit is below −e then the bad type will block implementation,
otherwise his bid will be zero thus revenue is the same as in the ﬁxed-cash hybrid.
14Another way of doing the same is by ﬁxing the size of the deposit the winner should pay
upon winning the auction (only the winner pays) and he can claim it back upon implementation.
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Unconstrained Bids The two hybrids presented before share the characteristic
that the seller determines ex-ante the bid in one of the securities. For instance,
in the ﬁxed-equity hybrid, the seller ﬁxes the fraction of equity asked but let
buyers to compete in cash. Meanwhile, in the ﬁxed-cash hybrid, the seller ﬁxes
the possible bids of cash but let buyers to compete in equity. Alternatively, one
can think in a format where the seller decides to run a second price auction but
without imposing any restriction on buyers' bids. Thus, each player bid consists
on a tuple bi = (αi, βi) ∈ R × [0, 1], where αi represents the equity promised on
the return of the project and βi corresponds to an upfront payment in cash. The
critical diﬀerence of this approach with respect to the former is that now there is
no trivial way to rank bids and determine the winner of the auction. Suppose the
seller uses an order ψ such that (R× [0, 1], ψ) constitutes a linearly ordered set.
Proposition 8 Fix an arbitrary ψ. The dominant strategy equilibrium of the
second price auction under unconstrained bids corresponds to: b1 = (0, v1 − c− e)
if v1 − c > 0 and b1 = (1, 0) otherwise; b2 = (1, 0).
Proof. If the project is not proﬁtable for buyer 2 his dominant strategy is to bid
the whole equity and nothing in cash. Following this strategy, he makes sure the
project is never implemented at no cost, and so, he never suﬀers the externality.
When the project is proﬁtable for both, bidder 1 oﬀers his reservation value in the
cheapest way, which involves only cash, as he is the highest type and any marginal
fraction he bids in equity is only valued by the seller with respect to the expected
type. Given this strategy, bidder 2 oﬀers the whole equity and no cash, to block
the allocation in which buyer 1 wins the auction and implements the project.
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Notice that this equilibrium is obtained irrespectively of the order ψ the seller
uses to rank the bids. The result follows because equity is the instrument that
permits to avoid the externality without paying any cost. This is the worst case
scenario for the seller, as the revenue under unconstrained bids is Πub = 0. The
critical assumption is that the auction is a second price, because the buyer is forced
to pay each component of his opponent bid.
2.4 Robustness: Private Buyer's Valuations
In this section we will analyze the set of securities under the assumption that
buyers do not longer know the valuation of his opponent, which turns our model
into a standard private values auction model. We will analyze how the information
structure aﬀects our main result.
2.4.1 Fixed-Equity Hybrid
Analogously to section 2.3.1 we characterize the equilibrium under private infor-
mation. We use the Bayes-Nash equilibrium as the solution concept.
Proposition 9 Bayes-Nash equilibrium bidding strategies of the second price auc-
tion when the seller uses ﬁxed-equity, α¯, are characterized by
i) bi(vi) = 0 if (1− α¯)vi − c < 0.
ii) bi(vi) = (1− α¯)vi − c+ (1− F ( c1−α¯))(−e) if (1− α¯)vi − c > 0.
Proof. As the seller utilizes a second price auction, and buyers bid in cash, the best
strategy for a buyer who ﬁnds proﬁtable to implement the project is to bid their
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reservation value. Now, buyer i's reservation value depends on the implementation
decision of his opponent. Thus, with probability F ( c
1−α¯) it is not proﬁtable for the
other buyer to implement the project, and so buyer i's reservation value is equal to
the net payoﬀ of implementing the project: (1− α¯)vi− c. On the other hand, with
probability 1−F ( c
1−α¯) it is proﬁtable for the other buyer to implement the project,
which implies that in case buyer i loses the auction he will suﬀer the externality e,
and thus, such expected loss has to be added to his bid. For the buyer who does not
want to implement the project his reservation value is given by 1 − F ( c
1−α¯)(−e).
If he bids his reservation value, he will lose with probability one if he faces an
opponent who wants to implement the project. In such case his payment will be e.
On the other hand, when he faces an opponent who does not want to implement
the project neither, his expected payoﬀ will be 1
2
(1− F ( c
1−α¯))(e). Hence, there is
clearly a proﬁtable deviation to zero. By doing this the buyer will continue losing
the auction when facing an opponent who wants to implement the project, and
then will obtain the same payoﬀ, but now will obtain a zero payoﬀ if he faces an
opponent who does not want to implement.
Following the same reasoning as with the public case, seller's ex-ante revenue
is given by
Πfe(α¯) = 2F (
c
1− α¯ )
∫ v¯
c
1−α¯
(α¯v1)f(v1)dv1
+
∫ v¯
c
1−α¯
∫ v¯
c
1−α¯
[(1− α¯) min{v1, v2} − c+ (1− F ( c
1− α¯ ))(−e) + α¯max{v1, v2}]f(v1)f(v2)dv1dv2
The ﬁrst term in the integral corresponds to the case when one buyer ﬁnds
proﬁtable to implement the project and the other does not. In this scenario, the
seller collects the ﬁxed equity portion from the highest type and receives zero in
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cash. Meanwhile, the second term represents the expected revenue when both
buyers want to implement the project. Here the seller receives the equity portion
from the highest type, plus the cash embedded in the lowest bid.
2.4.2 Fixed-Cash Hybrid
In a similar fashion to section 2.3.2 we characterize the equilibrium under private
information. We show that the existence of a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in pure
strategies depends on the relationship between the ﬁxed amount of cash b¯ and the
value of the externality e.
Proposition 10 There are no equilibria in pure strategies in the ﬁxed-cash hybrid
if:
i) −b¯ > e and (1− F (c+ b¯))e < −b¯.
ii) −b¯ > e and (1− F (c+ b¯))e > −b¯.
Proof. The problem to reach an equilibrium on case (i) resides in the optimal
strategy of the buyer's type who does not want to implement the project: the bad
type. If both buyers of such type bid zero, any of them would ﬁnd proﬁtable to
deviate and bid the smallest amount that guarantees him to be the winner of the
auction. In such case the deviant buyer would get a payoﬀ of −b¯ which is greater
than (1 − F (c + b¯))e. For the same reason, the other buyer also deviates to the
same bid, which yields a payoﬀ of F (c+ b¯)(− b¯
2
)(1−F (c+ b¯))(−b¯) to both buyers.
Notice that in such situation both buyers block the implementation with certainty
and share the cost. Nonetheless, as soon as both buyers bid the same amount,
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any of them -say buyer i- has an incentive to bid an arbitrarily lower amount. It
guarantees to suﬀer the externality with a very low probability in case he faces
the good type of buyer −i, but saves his portion of the ﬁxed amount of cash when
faces his fellow bad type. The moment buyer i deviates, buyer −i has two possible
deviations, either to bid lower than buyer i, or returning to the initial bid. The
former deviation is more proﬁtable. Continuing with this analysis, some buyer
will reach a level at which there is no downward deviation for his rival. That is,
a point where if his opponent submits a lower bid, he will suﬀer a payoﬀ lower
than −b¯. Or in other words, a bid k ∈ (0, 1) such that F (b−1(k))(e) = b¯. Under
this scenario, if buyer i bids k, the best deviation for buyer −i is to return to
the initial bid, which will start again the cycle of deviations. In order to prove
case (ii) it is worth noting that bad buyers will make a bid of zero. Now the
problem resides on the good buyers. Consider the type vi = c + b¯. If he bids
bi(vi) =
vi−c−b¯
vi
he wins against all the types that do now want to implement the
project getting a payoﬀ of zero but loses against all the other types that want
to implement the project (it is clear that no bidder who wants to implement the
project has incentives to bid below his reservation value without considering the
externality). Whenever he loses, he gets e for sure (he only loses against types that
are willing to implement at his reservation value) which is worse than paying b¯ and
not implementing. Hence, he is better oﬀ blocking every possible implementation:
bidding the smallest amount that guarantees him to be the winner of the auction.
Suﬃciently many types will deviate to this bid as long as −b¯ > e, because they
can block potential implementation. At this point the cyclical logic of case (i)
comes into place, not for the bad types now but for the good types, and no
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equilibrium is reached in pure strategies.
Proposition 11 Bayes-Nash equilibrium bidding strategies of the second price
auction under the ﬁxed-cash hybrid, when −b¯ ≤ e, are characterized by
i) bi(vi) =
vi−c−b¯
vi
, if vi − c− b¯ > 0.
ii) bi(vi) = 0 if vi − c− b¯ < 0.
Proof. In case (ii) the project is not proﬁtable for the buyer, and moreover,
the negative externality e is lower than the loss he would get by winning the
auction and not implementing the project, −b¯. As there is no way to prevent the
implementation of the project by his competitor without winning the auction, the
best strategy of the bad type is to bid zero in equity. In case (i), the buyer ﬁnds
proﬁtable to implement the project, and his best strategy is to bid his reservation
value -which does not depends on the implementation decision of his opponent. If
bi(vi) >
vi−c−b¯
vi
he will win whenever bi(vi) > b−i(v−i) but there are two diﬀerent
situations. When b−i(v−i) < vi−c−b¯vi buyer i will win the auction and implement
the project, guaranteeing for himself a payoﬀ of at least zero. When bi(vi) >
b−i(v−i) > vi−c−b¯vi buyer i will win the auction but cannot implement the project,
thus his payoﬀ is −b¯. By deviating to bi(vi) = vi−c−b¯vi he keeps the positive payoﬀs
(wins and implements in all the cases he wants to do so) and at most suﬀers a
payoﬀ of e upon losing which is better than −b¯.
Once we have derived the equilibrium strategies we can state the expression
for seller's expected revenue. Given we have equilibrium whenever −b¯ < e we can
state the revenue just for this particular case.
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Πfc(b¯) = 2(1− F (c+ b¯))F (c+ b¯)b¯
+
∫ v¯
c+b¯
∫ b¯
c+b¯
(min{v1 − c− b¯
v1
,
v2 − c− b¯
v2
}max{v1, v2}+ b¯)f(v1)f(v2)dv1dv2
2.4.3 Equity
To analyze equity, we cannot simply take bidding strategies as particular cases of
the ﬁxed-cash hybrid, because now even for very low valuations the buyer can bid
suﬃciently high, and still avoid a positive payment to the seller.
Proposition 12 Equilibrium bidding strategy when the seller uses equity is uniquely
characterized by bi(vi) = 1.
Proof. Clearly, if vi − c < 0 buyer i will not implement the project if he wins, so
winning the project only has value as long as it prevents the other agent to win and
implement the project, because in this case buyer i avoids the negative externality
it would entail. Now if vi−c > 0, in principle buyer i optimal strategy is to bid his
reservation value, as now he has the normal trade-oﬀ any buyer faces in an auction:
increasing the bid increases the probability of winning but decreases the surplus.
However, the presence of the externality biases buyer's incentives towards winning
the auction. In concrete, if vi − c > 0 but small, the buyer might be better oﬀ by
bidding one in equity and avoiding the externality with certainty, than gambling
on winning the auction and suﬀering the externality with positive probability.
This behavior may give room for the possibility of having a cut-oﬀ strategy. If
this were the case, there would exist a value v˜ such that if vi < v˜ then bi(vi) = 1 and
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vi
bi(vi)
1− c− b¯− e
1
10 v˜
Figure 2.5: Threshold equilibrium under Equity
if vi ≥ v˜ then buyers bid their reservation value -which includes the externality
he would suﬀer in case of his opponent implements the project. In such case
the strategy of buyer i would have a discontinuity at v˜, as shown in ﬁgure 2.5.
However, if it were the case, at v˜ the bid of the agent will be the lowest possible,
which implies he loses the auction for sure and will suﬀer the externality with
positive probability. Thus, bidding one is a proﬁtable deviation. This observation
holds for any value v˜ < 1. Therefore, both agents will bid one in equilibrium and
the project is never implemented.
2.4.4 Example Revisited
Following the example presented in section 2.3 we show the values of α¯∗, Πfe, b¯∗,
Πfc, Πca and Πeq for diﬀerent distributions of types when the cost of implementing
the project is c = 0.1 and the externality is e = −0.2.
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Table 2.2: Seller expected revenue under optimal securities: Private Info
Expected Seller Revenue
Distribution α¯∗ b¯∗ Πfe(α¯∗) Πca Πfc(b¯∗) Πeq
U [0, 1] 0.67 0.42 0.54 0.39 0.35 0
B[2, 2] 0.58 0.32 0.55 0.45 0.34 0
B[2, 7] 0.23 ∗∗ 0.18 0.17 ∗∗ 0
IB[2, 7] 0.75 0.2 0.91 0.80 0.68 0
**: b¯ is in the no equilibrium range
Even though the table computes Πfc only for the case where we have an equi-
librium in pure strategies, our results are robust: Most of the entries on table 2.2
are similar to the ones presented on table 2.1. The only diﬀerence is b¯ for the
IB[2, 7] because now the seller can force bidders to bid in equity without consider-
ing the externality and he seems willing to do so.15 However the payoﬀ he obtains
is similar to the case of public information.
2.5 Concluding Remarks
We analyzed a simple two-buyer second price auction, where the seller can use two
diﬀerent hybrids and the buyers suﬀer negative externalities upon the implemen-
tation of the project by their opponent. In particular, we consider a ﬁxed-equity
hybrid, where the seller ﬁxes a portion of equity over project's return and buyers
compete in cash; and a ﬁxed-cash hybrid, where the buyers compete in equity and
the winner has to pay an amount in cash predetermined by the seller.
Our main observation lies in the fact that pure securities equip low-valuation
buyers (those who do not want to implement the project, or bad types) with a
150.2 is the α¯∗ that maximizes revenue on α¯∗ ∈ [0.2, 1] but it is still possible (although unlikely)
that α¯∗ < 0.2.
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powerful tool to block the implementation from the good types, which impacts
revenue negatively. Then, we ﬁnd that in order to circumvent this problem the
seller has to incorporate a ﬁxed payment in the instruments to be used as a device
to prevent bad types from blocking. However, mitigating this adverse selection
problem poses a tradeoﬀ on the seller: by increasing the ﬁxed portion of the
hybrid utilized, the project becomes less proﬁtable for buyers, and thus, induces
less participation.
The ﬁxed-equity hybrid conducts the screening in cash, whereas the ﬁxed-cash
hybrid conducts the screening in equity. If the seller decides to use the latter,
buyers retain the power of blocking the implementation, conditional on the fact
that they decide to participate in the auction -which now depends on the ﬁxed-
amount of cash requested by seller to the winners. On the other hand, when the
seller uses the former, the screening is realized in cash, which is the cheapest way
good types can use to distinguish themselves. Therefore, the screening realized
is more eﬀective, and the seller ends up trading with the good types more often.
This is the intuition that justiﬁes the preeminence of the ﬁxed-equity hybrid as
the best instrument in the menu. At the same time, that is the reason why equity
is the worst. More surprisingly is the result that the optimal ﬁxed-cash hybrid
performs worse than cash, if the value of the externality is suﬃciently high (in
absolute value). However, it reﬂects the fact that when buyers want to avoid a
suﬃciently high negative externality, their willingness to pay upfront more than
oﬀsets the potential extraction through equity.
An interesting feature of our result is that it seems to be robust to the structure
of the information. That is, even when buyer's valuations are private information,
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the ﬁxed-equity hybrid continues to be the best, and equity continues to be the
worst. However, the ﬁxed-equity instrument now does not always have an equi-
librium in pure strategies, which increases the uncertainty over seller's revenue in
the more general case.
Finally, we analyze what would happen to the optimal ﬁxed-payment portion
in both hybrids when the distribution improves in the Monotone Likelihood Ratio
property. Intuitively, we obtain that the amount of cash in the ﬁxed-cash hybrid
is non-decreasing, and that under some condition of the distributions, the equity
portion in the ﬁxed-equity hybrid is also non-decreasing. These results state that
when buyers draw better valuations, the seller is less concerned about inducing
participation, and can extract a higher surplus from the winner of the auction.
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Appendix
A. Omitted Proofs
Proof of Theorem 6.
We will prove the theorem following three steps. First we will prove that
the optimal ﬁxed-equity hybrid involves a portion of equity α¯∗ ∈ (0, 1), which
immediately implies that the hybrid dominates pure cash in revenue. Analogously,
in the second step we will show that the optimal ﬁxed-cash hybrid involves a
positive amount of cash (i.e. b¯∗ > 0), which in turn implies that it dominates pure
equity in revenue. Finally, we will prove that the revenue under cash is higher
than the revenue under the optimal ﬁxed-cash hybrid.
Step 1 We take ﬁrst order conditions by applying Leibniz' rule to the three
diﬀerent terms in (2.1). First derivative D1(α¯, c, e) corresponds to:
2F (
c
1− α¯)[
(c− e)e
(1− α¯)2f(
c− e
(1− α¯))−
∫ c−e
1−α¯
c
1−α¯
v1f(v1)dv1]
− 2f( c
1− α¯)
c
(1− α¯)2
∫ c−e
1−α¯
c
1−α¯
((1− α¯)v1 − c)f(v1)dv1
Likewise, second derivative D2(α¯, c, e) is given by
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2F (
c
1− α¯)[
(α¯c− e)
1− α¯
(c− e)
(1− α¯)2f(
c− e
(1− α¯))
+
∫ v¯
c−e
1−α¯
v1f(v1)dv1]− 2f( c
1− α¯)
c
(1− α¯)2
∫ c−e
1−α¯
c
1−α¯
(α¯v1 − e)f(v1)dv1
Finally, applying Leibniz rule twice in the third term and using the fact that val-
uations are independently and identically distributed, the third derivative D3(α¯, c, e)
becomes:
2[
∫ v¯
c
1−α¯
(α¯v1 − e)f(v1)dv1] c
(1− α¯)2f(
c
1− α¯)
+
∫ v¯
c
1−α¯
∫ v¯
c
1−α¯
(max{v1, v2} −min{v1, v2})f(v1)f(v2)dv1dv2
Letting D˜(α, c, e) = D1(α, c, e) +D2(α, c, e) +D3(α, c, e) we have that
D˜(0, c, e) = 2F (c)[
∫ v¯
c−e
v1f(v1)dv1 −
∫ c−e
c
v1f(v1)dv1]
− 2f(c)c[
∫ c−e
c
(v1 − c)f(v1)dv1]− e(1− 2F (c) + F (c− e))]
+
∫ v¯
c
∫ v¯
c
(max{v1, v2} −min{v1, v2})f(v1)f(v2)dv1dv2
Now, we will explore the behavior of the ﬁrst order condition when the cost
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tends to zero.
lim
c↓0
D˜(0, c, e) =
∫ v¯
0
∫ v¯
0
(max{v1, v2} −min{v1, v2})f(v1)f(v2)dv1dv2 > 0 ∀e < 0
Notice that for a given e, as D˜(0, c, e)) is continuous, there exists a cut-oﬀ in
the cost
c¯1 := sup{c˜ > 0 : D˜(0, c, e) > 0 for all c ∈ (0, c˜)}
Moreover,
lim
α¯→1
Πfe(α¯) = 0
and,
Πfe(0) = 2F (c)[
∫ c−e
c
(v − c)f(v)dv +
∫ v¯
c−e
(−e)f(v)dv]
+
∫ v¯
c
∫ v¯
c
(min{v1, v2} − c− e)f(v1)f(v2)dv1dv2 > 0
Therefore, because revenue is strictly increasing at α¯ = 0 and Πfe(0) > Πfe(1)
for all e, the optimal fraction of equity α¯∗ ∈ (0, 1).
Step 2 Now we will prove that the optimal portion of cash in the ﬁxed-cash
hybrid is positive. That is, b¯∗ > 0.
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Taking ﬁrst order conditions of (2.2) with respect to b¯ we have that
b¯∗ =
1− F (c+ b¯∗)
f(c+ b¯∗)
1 + F (c+ b¯∗)
2F (c+ b¯∗)
=
1
λ(c+ b¯∗)
1 + F (c+ b¯∗)
2F (c+ b¯∗)
(2.4)
where λ(·) is the hazard ratio associated with f .
Now, as the density f is log-concave, by theorem 3 in Bagnoli and Bergstrom
(2005) the hazard rate λ of F is an increasing function. Therefore, the second
derivative of (2.2) is negative for all b¯, and the expression in (2.4) corresponds
to its unique global solution. Intuitively, if the seller raises marginally the ﬁxed
amount b¯, his revenue increases by this amount only with probability 1−F (c+ b¯),
which is the likelihood that the project is proﬁtable for a particular buyer. On
the other hand, f(b¯), measures the loss in implementation the seller will cause by
rising the ﬁxed amount of cash requested. That is, the seller will gain the marginal
amount in the cash requested except in those cases where the winner was already
indiﬀerent between implementing or not the project. In those cases, if the seller
raises b¯ now the project is not proﬁtable for the winner, and the seller will reduce
participation. This expression is scaled by the factor at the right.
Step 3 In the last step we will show that the revenue under cash is higher than
the revenue under the optimal ﬁxed-cash hybrid.
Let b¯∗ be the optimal ﬁxed-cash amount when the cost is zero, and thus b¯∗ =
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1−F (b¯∗)
f(b¯∗)
1+F (b¯∗)
2F (b¯∗) . Hence,
lim
c↓0
Πfe(0, c, e) = −e+
∫ v¯
0
∫ v¯
0
min{v1, v2}f(v1)f(v2)dv1dv2
> −e+
∫ v¯
b¯∗
∫ v¯
b¯∗
min{v1, v2}f(v1)f(v2)dv1dv2
That is, when the cost approaches to zero from above, the expected revenue
when the seller uses cash is higher than the expected revenue under the best ﬁxed-
cash hybrid.
Now, ﬁx c ∈ (c, c¯). Using the expressions of revenue for ﬁxed-equity (2.1) and
ﬁxed-cash (2.2) hybrids, we need to show that
Πfe(0, c, e) = 2F (c)[
∫ c−e
c
(v1 − c)f(v1)dv1 +
∫ v¯
c−e
(−e)f(v1)dv1]
+
∫ v¯
c
∫ v¯
c
[min{v1, v2} − c− e]f(v1)f(v2)dv1dv2
is greater than
Πfc(b¯∗, c, e) = 2
∫ c+b¯∗(c)
0
∫ v¯
c+b¯∗(c)
b¯∗f(v1)f(v2)dv1dv2
+
∫ v¯
c+b¯∗(c)
∫ v¯
c+b¯∗(c)
b¯∗f(v1)f(v2)dv1dv2
Or rearranging terms, we need that
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2F (c)[
∫ c−e
c
(v1 − c)f(v1)dv1 +
∫ v¯
c−e
(−e)f(v1)dv1] + (1− F (c))2(−c− e)
+
∫ v¯
c+b¯∗(c)
∫ v¯
c+b¯∗(c)
[min{v1, v2} − b¯∗(c)]f(v1)f(v2)dv1dv2∫ c+b¯∗(c)
0
∫ c+b¯∗(c)
0
min{v1, v2}f(v1)f(v2)dv1dv2
be greater than
(1− F (c+ b¯∗(c))2)
f(c+ b¯∗(c))
(1 + F (c+ b¯∗(c)))
where the last expression is obtained by replacing the functional form of b¯∗(c).
Hence, to show that Πfe(0) > Πfc(b¯∗(c)) is suﬃcient that
−e > 1 + F (c+ b¯
∗(c))
f(c+ b¯∗(c))
+ c− 2
(1− F (c))2
∫ c+b¯∗(c)
0
(1− F (v1))f(v1)v1dv1
Therefore we can deﬁne
−e = arg max
c∈(0,c¯)
{1 + F (c+ b¯
∗(c))
f(c+ b¯∗(c))
+ c− 2
(1− F (c))2
∫ c+b¯∗(c)
0
(1−F (v1))f(v1)v1dv1}
Figure 2.6 shows the behavior of c¯ as a function of |e|. If c < c¯ then theorem
6 holds thus Πfc(0) > Πfc(b¯∗), otherwise the reverse is true.
On table 2.3 we explore theorem 6 by showing the value of e for diﬀerent
distributions. Alongside, we present the values of Πfe(0) and Πfc(b¯∗) for diﬀerent
values of e, to conﬁrm why the bound is needed although it is rather low.
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Figure 2.6: Upper bound of the cost for diﬀerent distributions
Table 2.3: Revenue in Cash and Fixed-Cash as a function of e
Expected Seller Revenue
Distribution e Πfe(0) Πfc(b¯∗) b¯∗ e
U [0, 1]
−0.001 0.334333
0.3849 0.57735 −0.0512−0.01 0.343333
−0.1 0.433333
B[2, 2]
−0.001 0.372429
0.375 0.5 −0.0036−0.01 0.381429
−0.1 0.471429
B[2, 7]
−0.001 0.15002
0.152539 0.222329 −0.0035−0.01 0.15902
−0.1 0.24902
IB[2, 7]
−0.001 0.705575
0.656547 0.718398 @−0.01 0.714575
−0.1 0.804575
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Proof of Theorem 7. We will prove the result using techniques of monotone
comparative statics on lattice programming, for which we need to introduce some
the deﬁnitions and results of this theory.
Deﬁnition 13 (Milgrom and Shannon (1994)) Let X and T be non-empty
subsets of R and let g : X×T → R. We say g satisﬁes the strict single crossing
property (SSCP) in (x, t) if for every x′′, x′ in X and t′′, t′ in T , with x′′ > x′
and t′′ > t′
g(x′′, t′) ≥ g(x′, t′) implies g(x′′, t′′) > g(x′, t′′) (2.5)
and we write g(·, t′′) SSCP g(·, t′).
Deﬁnition 14 (Quah and Strulovici (2009)) Let X and T be non-empty sub-
sets of R, and let {g(·, t)}t∈T be a family of real valued functions deﬁned on
X, we say that g(·, t′) is interval order dominated by g(·, t′′) -with the notation
g(·, t′′) IDO g(·, t′′)- if equation (2.5) holds for all x′ < x′′ whenever g(x, t′) <
g(x′′, t′′) for all x ∈ [x′, x′′].
Proposition 15 (Quah and Strulovici (2009)) Let X and T be respectively
an interval and a non-empty subsets of R, and suppose that {g(x, ·)}t∈T is a family
of real valued functions, which are also absolutely continuous in intervals of X;
and that there is a positive an increasing function h : X → R such that g′(x, t′′) >
h(x)g′(x, t′) a.e. Then, g(·, t′′) IDO g(·, t′)
Theorem 16 (Quah and Strulovici (2009)) Let X and T be non-empty sub-
sets of R and let g(·, t′′), g(·, t′) be two real valued functions deﬁned on X, with
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t′′, t′ ∈ T such that t′′ > t′. If g(·, t′′) IDO g(·, t′) then
argmaxx∈Jg(·, t′′) > argmaxx∈Jg(·, t′) for any interval J of X. (2.6)
Furthermore, if (2.6) is satisﬁed then g(·, t′′) IDO g(·, t′)
Suppose f1 dominates f0 in the monotone likelihood ratio (MLR) and rewrite
(??) as
Πfe(α¯, t) = 2Ft(
c
1− α¯)
∫ c−e
1−α¯
c
1−α¯
((1− α¯)v1 − c)ft(v1)dv1 (2.7)
+ 2Ft(
c
1− α¯)
∫ v¯
c−e
1−α¯
(α¯v1 − e)ft(v1)dv1
+
∫ v¯
c
1−α¯
∫ v¯
c
1−α¯
[(1− α¯) min{v1, v2} − c− e+ α¯max{v1, v2}]ft(v1)ft(v2)dv1dv2
with t ∈ {0, 1}. It is suﬃcient to show that there exists a positive and increasing
function h(α) such that Πfeα (α, 1) > h(α)Π
fe
α (α, 0) to show that α
∗
1 ≥ α∗0, in virtue
of proposition 15 and theorem 16.
Deﬁne h(α, c) =
f1(
c−e
1−α¯ )
f0(
c
1−α¯ )
and g(α, c) =
F1(
c
1−α¯ )
F0(
c
1−α¯ )
. Notice that h(α, c) is increasing
in α for all c, and hence, if we show that Πfeα (α, 1) − h(α, c)Πfeα (α, 0) > 0 we can
conclude that Πfe(α, 1) IDO Πfe(α, 0) In order to show that, we can proceed
separately as we did with the derivative the proof of theorem 6.
Thus, for the ﬁrst term we have
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2(c− e)e
(1− α¯)2 f(
c
(1− α¯)) [g(α, c)− h(α, c)]− 2
∫ c−e
1−α¯
c
1−α¯
v1[g(α, c)
f1(v1)
f0(v1)
− h(α, c)]dv1
(2.8)
Likewise, the second term corresponds to
2(α¯c− e)
1− α¯
c− e
(1− α¯)2 [g(α, c)− h(α, c)] + 2
∫ v¯
c
1−α¯
v1[g(α, c)
f1(v1)
f0(v1)
− h(α, c)]dv1 (2.9)
The third term is equal to
2c
(1− α¯)2
∫ v¯
c
1−α¯
(α¯v1 − e)[ f1(v)
f0(v1)
− h(α, c)]dv1 (2.10)
+
∫ v¯
c
1−α¯
∫ v¯
c
1−α¯
(max{v1, v2} −min{v1, v2})[f1(v1)f1(v2)
f0(v1)f0(v2)
− h(α, c)]dv1dv2
Grouping the ﬁrst terms in (2.8) and (2.9), respectively, we get
2α¯(c− e)2
(1− α¯)3 [g(α, c)− h(α, c)] (2.11)
Likewise, adding the second terms in (2.8) and (2.9) we obtain
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2∫ v¯
c−e
1−α¯
v1[g(α, c)
f1(v1)
f0(v1)
− h(α, c)]dv1 (2.12)
Terms (2.10)-(2.12) imply the result because we assume that g(α, c) > h(α, c),
f0 is dominated in MLR by f1, and the inferior limit of all the integrals involved
is greater than or equal to c
1−α¯ .
Applying the same argument, we can see that b¯∗1 > b¯
∗
0 if and only if
− 2b¯+ 1
λ0(c+ b¯)
1 + F0(c+ b¯)
F0(c+ b¯)
> h(b¯)[−2b¯+ 1
λ1(c+ b¯)
1 + F1(c+ b¯)
F1(c+ b¯)
] (2.13)
for h(·) increasing and positive.
Notice that as f1 dominates f0 in MLR then the hazard ratio is decreasing (i.e
λ0 < λ1). Moreover, it implies that F1 dominates F0 in ﬁrst stochastic dominance
order (FOSD), which in turn implies that 1+F0(c+b¯)
F0(c+b¯)
< 1+F1(c+b¯)
F1(c+b¯)
. Therefore the
condition in (2.13) is satisﬁed for h(·).
B. Simulation for Diﬀerent Distributions
Following the results presented on ﬁgure 2.4, here we show the behavior of revenue
as a function of α¯ and b¯ for the main distributions considered in this chapter.
Figure 2.7 has the functions for a Beta[2, 2], ﬁgure 2.8 has the functions for a
Beta[2, 7] and ﬁgure 2.9 has the functions for an InverseBeta[2, 7]
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Figure 2.7: Revenue as a function of α¯ and b¯ for B[2, 2]
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Figure 2.8: Revenue as a function of α¯ and b¯ for B[2, 7]
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Figure 2.9: Revenue as a function of α¯ and b¯ for IB[2, 7]
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Chapter 3
Bidding with Securities: Insurance
and Eﬃciency
3.1 Introduction
In a seminal work, DeMarzo, Kremer and Skrzypacz (2005) (henceforth DKS) in-
troduces a general framework to analyse security-bid auctionsauctions where the
bidder's payment to the seller is securitized by the underlying return of the asset
being auctioned. Their central ﬁnding is that securities that are more sensitive to
the winner's true type (steeper securities) yield the seller higher expected revenue.
DKS formalizes Hansen (1985) insight. Moreover, they show that the auction for-
mat to which the seller commits only aﬀects revenues via its ability to modify the
steepness of the security utilized.
DKS analyze a setting with risk-neutral, ex-ante homogeneous bidders who
receive i.i.d. signals about the private value of the asset. Our contribution is to
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introduce ex-ante heterogeneously risk-averse bidders to their setting. In practice,
security auctions are often used to sell the rights to the stream of payoﬀs from
long-term projects, and there is extensive uncertainty over what those future cash
ﬂows will be.1 In such environments, it is paramount to understand how the
heterogeneous attitudes of diﬀerent bidders toward risk aﬀects their bidding and
the auction eﬃciency.
Greater risk aversion causes bidders to discount bids by more, because they
suﬀer greater disutility when asset revenues turn out to be low. The key conse-
quence of this heterogeneity is that bids' face values and bidders' types cease to
be aligned: a more risk-averse bidder may lose an auction even when its under-
lying distribution of payoﬀs stochastically dominates that of the winning bidder. 2
The ineﬃciencies that result resemble those that arise when some bidders are ﬁ-
nancially constrained (e.g. Che and Gale (1998)). There, bidders with budget
constraints experience handicaps that limit their competitiveness in an auction,
even when they have better valuations. In a similar fashion, Board (2007) shows
that a second-price auction yields higher revenue for the seller than a ﬁrst-price
auction when bankruptcy represents a concern.
In our realm, we show that steeper securities both alleviate these ineﬃciencies
and increase seller's expected revenue. The central force underlying this result is
that steeper securities provide bidders more insurance, because they ask for lower
payments when the realizations of the project are low, and vice versa when they
are high. This insurance levels the ﬁeld for more risk-averse bidders, inducing them
1Examples of such auctions include coal leases in the US, 3G telecommunication rights in
Hong Kong; see DKS for additional examples.
2A similar eﬀect can be observed in takeover auctions when bidders have heterogeneous stan-
dalone values and exhibit diﬀerent synergies when merged with the target ﬁrm (cf. Liu (2016)).
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to bid relatively more aggressively, and improving the alignment of private signals
and bids.
We show that when the seller switches from a ﬂatter to a steeper security, the
valuation type of the winning bidder never decreases. This result has a clear eﬀect
on both eﬃciency and expected seller revenue: not only does the distribution of
project payoﬀs of the winner weakly improve, but, as DKS shows, steeper securities
also allow the seller to extract a higher share of the surplus.
Finally, we deliver a result on eﬃciency that is non-classical in the auction
literature: we show that if the auction environment is suﬃciently rich, the only
security that guarantees ex-post Pareto eﬃciency is the steepest possible onethe
call option. Intuitively, the only dimension on which bidders and seller interests
could possibly be aligned is the steepness of the security, because steeper securities
allow the seller to extract a higher surplus and provide more insurance to the
bidders. Therefore, if bidders are suﬃciently risk averse, using a locally steeper
security might be mutually beneﬁcial.
Our ﬁndings have direct policy implications for the design of auctions where
a government is interested in both, procuring eﬃciency and maximizing revenue,
as in selling the right to exploit public resources. In our model, we abstract from
other possible schemes the seller might use to provide insurance or induce higher
participation.
We provide two cases where our setup is relevant. The ﬁrst one took place in
the US, during the coal lease carried out by the government. The second exam-
ple comes from Hong Kong, where it was decided to perform the 3G auction on
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equity.3 The Hong Kong auction was a reaction to the concerns raised at the 3G
European auction. Binmore and Klemperer (2002) state that during the British
3G auction, run with cash, one of the biggest concerns was to increase the num-
ber of bidders; namely, how to attract entrants the incentives for incumbents to
participate is always higher. Klemperer (2002) states that revenue in other 3G
European auctions was lower than the British one mostly because of a failure on
attracting entrants. We show that the policy followed by Hong Kong was the cor-
rect one since it cannot do any harm, but it can also lead to discrete increases on
surplus by allowing risk averse bidders more likely to win the auction, thus making
it more attractive to them.
Another related paper corresponds to Gorbenko and Malenko (2011). They
argue that reserve prices are detrimental for eﬃciency while securities are not.
We add that securities are beneﬁcial for eﬃciency, representing a stronger result.
Moreover, we extend Abhishek et al. (2015) result to heterogeneous risk averse
bidders since they extend DKS for the case of homogeneous risk averse bidders.
Lastly, Abhishek et al. (2015) analyses the case of homogeneous risk averse
bidders and shows that DKS revenue result still holds.
Empirical Evidence. In this section, we cover some particular applications for
our results. They show cases where bidders were risk averse, there was no reason
to believe the less risk averse bidder had a better distribution and using some kind
of security was allowed.
The ﬁrst case comes from the US. In the 20th century, the US conducted many
3Retrieved from http://archives.ofca.gov.hk/en/3g-auction/rules.pdf
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coal leases under diﬀerent formats.4 There were two main options to lease the
contracts: cash bonus and royalties. Cash bonus implied a ﬁxed amount to be
paid for the lease, usually when it was issued, or on a ﬁxed payment schedule.
A royalty is a payment made as production occurs based on the amount or value
of production. In terms of our model, cash is a ﬂatter instrument than royalty
(equity).
One concern about coal leases was the ownership patterns that have resulted
from the history of public land disposal. Often, speciﬁc ﬁrms had the lease of the
land prior to the auction taking place (incumbent), given them more information
about the mine that any other ﬁrm (entrant). This information gap created more
risk for the entrants.
In order to close this gap, the U.S Geological Survey (GS) estimated the value
of each tract to be oﬀered. The estimates obtained were disclosed to bidders prior
to the sale. In doing so, they were reducing the uncertainty of the project, reducing
the impact that risk aversion may have had.
In 1969, it was decided that the GS estimates would be conﬁdential, thus risk
aversion became a prominent issue again.
Since it is not clear that the most eﬃcient ﬁrm to operate a coal tract is the
incumbent because there could be ﬁrms that are better for the speciﬁc tract, we
would suggest that using royalty is a better way of mitigating the negative eﬀect
of risk aversion because they not only improve eﬃciency, but also revenue for the
government.
Our second case comes from Hong Kong. The 3G telecommunication auction
4The information comes from the report of the Linowes commission: Commission on Fair
Market Value Policy for Federal Coal Leasing (1984)
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in Hong Kong was conducted on equity and many economists were in favour of
such an idea (see for example Ure (2002)).
There were concerns about the value of the technology since it was not fully
known and there was no information available about alternative technologies at the
time, such as the 802.11 standard. Another concern in terms of valuing the licenses
was the growth of internet. The future market value of internet was diﬃcult to
be forecasted, thus the value of 3G was uncertain since it allowed accessing the
internet. As Ure argued at that time Still, no one knows what services will be
available, which of them will sell, who will buy them or how the revenue will be
collected along the value chain.
Looking at the uncertainty plus the arguments of several CEOs from the UK
complaining about the high price they paid to get a license, Ure proposed using
royalties in order to tie the payoﬀ of the license to the auction payment. As he
stated If no one could know the sensible value to place on a 3G licence, then an
up-front money auction was totally inappropriate.
The lack of information increased the risk of the project. This environment
is similar to the setup of our model where bidders are averse as a consequence of
such risk.
Organization of the chapter The rest of the chapter is structured as follows.
Section 3.2 presents an example with the main result of the chapter, Section 3.3
introduces the model and presents the main results regarding asymmetric bidders
and Section 3.4 presents the conclusions.
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3.2 A Motivating Example
Consider two bidders participating in a second-price, security-bid auction. Bidders
compete for the rights to a project that has a stochastic revenue and requires an
initial investment of X. We assume that X is commonly known and equal to 0.2.
Each bidder has private information about the distribution of the project's payoﬀs
if they undertake it.
We assume that the risk-neutral seller runs a second price auction using one
of four security types: cash, debt, equity or call option. The seller commits to a
security design and announces it to bidders, who then submit bids. A winner is
then determined, project revenues are realized, and payoﬀs are made according to
the security chosen by the losing bidder.
We assume that the project's revenue Z can attain two values, ZH and ZL
that stand for high and low. The high realization happens with probability pHi
and the low realization with probability 1−pHi . In this example we ﬁx ZH = 1 and
ZL = 0.1. Given this simpliﬁcation, it can be argued that the auction is eﬃcient
if the winner is the bidder with the highest pHi .
Bidders are heterogeneously risk averse and seek to maximize expected utility.
We assume that the functional form for utility over money is the same for both
bidders, u(m) = 1 − e(−λim), but that bidders diﬀer in the parameter λ: the less
risk averse bidder a has λa = 1, whereas the more risk averse b has λb = 4. Before
submitting bids, each bidder receives a signal of the parameter pHi , which can be
regarded as his type. We further ﬁx the probability of a high realization of the
less risk averse bidder to pHa = 0.5, and analyze the implications for eﬃciency as
we vary the parameter pHb of the more risk averse bidder.
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Due to the second price structure of the auction, it is a weakly dominant
strategy for both bidders to bid their reservation values σi, as we will see later. A
bidder's reservation value depends on the security used:
i) Cash: σcai := si : E[ui(Zi −X − si)|pHi ] = 0.
ii) Debt: σdei := si : E[ui(Max(0, Zi − si)−X)|pHi ] = 0.
iii) Equity: σeqi := si : E[ui((1− si)Zi −X)|pHi ] = 0.
iv) Call Option: σcoi := si : E[ui(Min(Zi, si)−X)|pHi ] = 0.
The auction would be eﬃcient in the classical way if the winner is the bidder
with the highest pHi , since for the same security the expect revenue for the seller
is increasing on pH .
We begin by noting that the auction will always be eﬃcient whenever pHa > p
H
b .
The interesting case is where the more risk averse bidder also has the highest pH .
When this is so, the steepness of the security matters because the more risk averse
bidder beneﬁts more from having insurance, bidding more aggressively in relative
terms as a result.
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Figure 3.1: Eﬃciency Range.
Figure 3.1 illustrates how eﬃciency is aﬀected by changes in the distribution of
the more risk averse bidder for the four diﬀerent types of securities. The gray area
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denotes the ranges of pHb for which the auction is eﬃcient for the four instruments.
To the right, it is eﬃcient because the more risk averse bidder winsregardless
of the insurancesince his probability of obtaining ZH is considerably higher. To
the left, it is eﬃcient because the less risk averse has the highest pH and wins.
In the green area only debt, equity and call option are eﬃcient, implying that
some insurance is needed to allow the more risk averse bidder to win. In the
blue area equity and call option are eﬃcient. In the pink area only call option
is eﬃcient. Finally, when pHb ∈ (0.65, 0.77), no instrument is eﬃcienteven with
the maximum insurance that call option provides, the more risk averse cannot
compensate for the risk aversion gap.
An important feature of the example is that the more risk averse bidder might
prefer a steeper security for two reasons: (1) he may win the auction in cases he
would otherwise lose it with a ﬂatter one; and (2) even if he wins in both cases,
the insurance provided by the steeper security may oﬀset the surplus extraction
done by the seller.5 This is the main reason why a suﬃciently risk averse bidder
may not prefer ex post the ﬂattest security conditional on winning.
3.3 The Model
The structure of the model follows DKS, but it is slightly modiﬁed to allow for
heterogeneous risk aversion. There is a risk neutral seller interested in allocating
an indivisible project among a set of N diﬀerent buyers. The project is valuable for
5In the example, when the more risk averse bidder has a coeﬃcient pHb = 0.62, he wins
under equity and call option, but prefers call option because with equity he has to pay his
reservation value, thus his expected utility is zero, while with call option he pays strictly less
than his reservation value (he will only pay his reservation value if pHb = 0.57) implying a positive
expected utility.
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all buyers but is useless if the seller undertakes it. To implement the project, any
buyer needs to make a non contractible investment of X > 0, which is considered
as the initial ﬁxed cost to implement the project and it is common knowledge to
all agents. If buyer i acquires the project, and makes the required investment,
then it will yield a (contractible) stochastic revenue of Zi.
Before buyers participate in the auction, they receive a private signal Vi of the
stochastic revenue Zi, which are identically and independently distributed accord-
ing to the positive everywhere density f on the support V := [v, v]. Likewise, the
conditional payoﬀ Zi, on the signal Vi = vi, has a positive and continuous density
h(Zi|vi) everywhere on the support Z := [0,∞). We assume that the parametrized
family {h(·|v)} satisﬁes the Strict Monotone Likelihood Ratio (sMLRP). That is,
the likelihood ratio h(z|v)/h(z|v′) is increasing in z if v > v′. All densities are
common knowledge.
All buyers are expected utility maximizers, but they are ex-ante heterogeneous
in their level of risk aversion, which is captured by the private parameter θi ∈ [θ, θ].
We assume that if θi > θj then buyer i is more risk averse than buyer j Each buyer
i has a utility function over money m denoted by ui(m) := u(m, θi) which is jointly
continuous, and concave and increasing in m. Furthermore, it is normalized so that
ui(0) = 0.
Bids are expressed by derivative securities in which the underlying asset is the
project's revenue Zi. Formally, a security is a function S : Z → R, where S(z)
represents buyer's payment to the seller when the realized revenue of the project
is equal to z.
As in DKS, buyers choose their bids from a linearly ordered family of securities
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S, which can be written as S := {S(·, s)|s ∈ [s0, s1]}. Here, if buyer i submits a bid
of s, he expects to make a payment equal of S(zi, s) to the seller in case he wins the
auction. The interval [s0, s1] can be used to parametrize all families of securities
without loss of generality.6 We assume that an ordered family of securities satisﬁes
the following two conditions.
Assumption 1 For all s, (i) S(z, s) and z−S(z, s) are continuous and increasing
and (ii) 0 ≤ S(z, s) ≤ z for all z.
Assumption 2 For all bidder i and all signal vi
i) EUi[S(s, vi)] := E[ui(Zi−X−S(Zi, s))|Vi = vi] is continuous and decreasing
in s, nonnegative for s = s0, and nonpositive for s = s1.
ii) ES(s, vi) := E[S(Zi, s|Vi = vi)] is continuous and increasing in s.
Assumption 1 states that the payment for the seller and the net payoﬀ for the
buyer are increasing in the revenue of the project for all security bids. Furthermore,
it says that securities have to be feasible: buyers cannot promise to pay more
than the revenue of the project, and the seller cannot ﬁnance its implementation. 7
Meanwhile, assumption 2 merely says that securities are completely ordered from
the perspective of the buyer and the seller.
Following DKS, we rank securities using the notion of steepness.
6The interval can be normalized to any close interval independent of the security S by rescaling
and translating the parameter s in S(·, s). For instance, if the security S is equity, a bid s can
be expressed as s = (sˆ− s0)/s1 for some sˆ ∈ [s0, s1].
7This last assumption is crucial to rule out Crémer (1987) critique, who claims that if the
seller could ﬁnance the implementation cost of the project, he would be able to extract the whole
surplus.
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Deﬁnition 17 Let ESs(s, v) and ESv(s, v) be the partial derivatives of ES(s, v).
The family of securities S ′ is steeper than the family S ′′ if for all S ′ ∈ S ′ and all
S ′′ ∈ S ′′, ES ′v(s′, v) > ES ′′v (s′′, v) whenever ES ′(s′, v) = ES ′′(s′′, v).
Steeper securities are then more sensitive to the true bidder's type at the point
where the expected payment to the seller is the same.
In particular, debt represents the ﬂattest instrument and call option the steep-
est.8 Indeed, for realizations below the debt value, the payment to the seller grows
at the same rate as the return of the project, whereas for realizations above the
debt value, the payment to the seller remains constant. Since it is impossible for
a security to generate a payment that grows faster than the return of the project
in virtue of the liability constraint, it implies that for realizations below the
debt value, debt cannot be crossed from below by any security. Once the payment
becomes ﬂat, it can only be crossed from below. Thus, debt cannot cross any in-
strument from below, implying it is the ﬂattest. By a similar argument, call option
is the steepest instrument. When the return is below the strike price, the payment
to the seller is constant and equal to zero, hence it cannot be crossed from below.
For realizations above the strike price, the payment to the seller grows at the same
rate as the realization of the project, and thus it can only cut other securities from
below. Therefore, since it cannot be crossed from below and it can only cut other
securities from below, it is the steepest instrument.9
8This ﬁgure can be seen in chapter 1 ﬁgure 1.
9The ﬁgure for debt, equity and call option in terms of steepness is provided in chapter 1.
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3.3.1 Equilibrium
In order to solve the game, denote σi(vi, S) as the security payment that makes
buyer i indiﬀerent between implementing or not the project, conditional on the fact
that his signal is vi and the seller is using security S. That is, σi(vi, S) is deﬁned
as the security bid s such that EUi[S(s, vi)] = 0. The existence and uniqueness of
s is guaranteed by assumption 2.
Lemma 18 The proﬁle (σ1(v,S), · · · , σN(vN , S)) constitutes an equilibrium in dom-
inant strategies to the game induced by a the second-price auction under security
S.
Proof. Suppose that (sj)j 6=i are the bids submitted by the opponents of bidder i
and let s
(1)
−i = max{sj, j 6= i}. Then, bidder i has to choose the security bid si
that maximizes his expected utility,
E[Ui(Zi −X − S(Zi, s(1)−i ))1(si > s(1)−i )]
By the law of iterated expectations, the last expression can be rewritten as
E[E[Ui(Zi −X − S(Zi, s(1)−i ))|Vi = vi]1(si > s(1)−i )]
Using assumption 2, and by the deﬁnition of σi(vi, S) it is immediate to conclude
that si = σi(vi, S) uniquely maximizes bidder's expected utility.
Given σi(vi, S), we can compute Ri(vi, S) = ES(σi(vi, S), vi) as the revenue
for the seller from the equilibrium bid of bidder i, given the signal vi. The
80
function B(vi, S, S
′) maps the revenue Ri(vi, S) into the bid s′ ∈ S ′ such that
ES(σi(vi, S), vi) = ES ′(s′, vi).
3.3.2 Insurance
Let φS : Z → Y ≡ [0, y¯] be the function that maps the revenue of the project into
the space of net return to the bidder, under security S.10 Thus, yS = φS(z) ≡
z − S(z). For easiness in the notation, we write yS simply as y when there is no
risk of confusion. An example of the net return for standard securities is presented
in ﬁgure 3.2.
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Figure 3.2: Payoﬀ Diagrams for Call Options, Equity, and Debt. The
monetary payoﬀ to the bidder exhibits the reverse single crossing property as in DKS. A
steeper instrument crosses from below a ﬂatter one for the seller, whereas for the bidder,
the crossing pattern is reversed.
Furthermore, we let GS denote the lottery over the set of net payoﬀs Y , induced
10We call net return to the realized return of the project after subtracting the payment to the
seller, but without subtracting the implementation cost.
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by the security S. We denote its density by gS.
Proposition 19 Let S ′ and S ′′ be two diﬀerent feasible securities, and suppose
that there exists a z∗ such that S ′(z) ≤ S ′′(z) for all z ≤ z∗, and S ′(z) > S ′′(z) for
all z > z∗. Then, if
∫ y¯
0
ygS′(y)dy =
∫ y¯
0
ygS′′(y)dy (3.1)
any risk averse individual would prefer the lottery GS′ to the lottery GS′′.
In other words, EUi[S ′(B(vi, S ′′, S ′), vi)|Vi = vi] > 0.
Proof. Notice that by the deﬁnition of net return and the single crossing property
in the ﬁrst part of the theorem, it follows immediately that φS′(z) ≥ φS′′(z) for all
z ≤ z∗ and φS′(z) < φS′′(z) for all z > z∗. That is, under low realizations of the
project the security bid S ′ yields a higher net return than S ′′, and vice-versa for
lower realizations.
Moreover, it also implies that the induced distributions also satisfy a single
crossing property. That is,
GS′(z) ≤ GS′′(z) for all z ≤ z∗ and GS′(z) > GS′′(z) for all z > z∗
Since net returns are non-negative, we can use integration by parts in (3.1) to
show that ∫ y¯
0
GS′(y)dy =
∫ y¯
0
GS′′(y)dy
Then, we have that ∫ y˜
0
[GS′(y)−GS′′(y)]dy ≤ 0
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for all y˜ ∈ Y . Otherwise, condition (3.1) would be violated.
Hence, we conclude that GS′ dominates GS′′ in Second Order Stochastic Dom-
inance (viz. GS′ SOSD GS′′). Therefore, by theorem 2 in Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1970), every risk averse buyer prefers GS′ to GS′′ . In other words, for each concave
utility function u(·), we have that
∫ y¯
0
u(y)gS′(y)dy ≥
∫ y¯
0
u(y)gS′′(y)dy
A particular example of proposition 19 is shown in ﬁgure 3.3.
The single crossing condition in the statement of proposition 19 implies that
any risk averse bidder would prefer the lottery induced by a steeper security. In
other words, steeper securities provide higher insurance to risk averse buyers.
3.3.3 Eﬃciency and Revenue
In this section, we provide the two core results on eﬃciency. The ﬁrst is more
standard to the auction literature, and says that the signal of the winning bidder
is weakly increasing in the steepness of the instrument utilized. The second one,
states that the only security that guarantees ex-post Pareto eﬃciency is call option.
Deﬁnition 20 Let V (n)(S) be the signal of the nth highest bid in a second-price
auction under security S, auction A(S). We say that A(S ′) is less ineﬃcient than
A(S ′′) (viz. A(S ′) LIN A(S ′′)) if
V (1)(S ′) ≥ V (1)(S ′′)
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Figure 3.3: Distribution Function of the Payoﬀ for Call Options, Equity,
and Debt. When the revenue distribution function is U [0, 1] and ES = 0.4 then GS(y)
follows the single crossing pattern of ﬁgure 3.2. If we compare call option and equity,
the blue area is equal to the red area since the mean of both distributions is the same,
implying call option second order stochastically dominates equity. The same result holds
true when comparing a steeper instrument with a ﬂatter one.
Notice that deﬁnition 20 does not rule out the fact that A(S) could be ineﬃcient
in the classical sense; that is, V (1)(S) < max{Vi : 1 ≤ i ≤ N}. However, if the
auction is eﬃcient under S ′′, then it has to be eﬃcient under S ′.
Proposition 21 If security S ′ is steeper than security S ′′ then A(S ′) LIN A(S ′′).
Proof. First, we notice that for any two buyers i and j, such that θi > θj, if
vi < vj, then σi(vi, S) < σj(vj, S) under any feasible security S. That is, for two
given buyers, the individual with a higher signal and lower risk aversion will always
submit a higher bid in equilibrium.
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The interesting case corresponds to the situation when θi > θj and vi > vj.
Suppose the seller switches from the security S ′′ to a steeper security S ′. As
commented before, there are two eﬀects that come into play: the insurance eﬀect
and the extraction eﬀect. The former positive eﬀect helps to alleviate the latter
negative eﬀect, and it is larger as more risk averse is the buyer. Let σi(S
′′, vi) and
σj(S
′, vj) the equilibrium bids under the security S ′′ and S', respectively. Now,
because both buyers are risk averse, ui and uj are concave. Moreover, ui can be
represented by a strict concave transformation of uj. Therefore, in virtue of our
previous discussion, EUi[S ′(B(vi, S ′′, S ′), vi)|Vi = vi] > 0 and by the concavity and
monotonicity we can obtain
EUi[S ′(B(vi, S ′′, S ′), vi)|Vi = vi] > EUj[S ′(B(vj, S ′′, S ′), vi)|Vj = vj]
since buyer i is more risk averse and the insurance provided by the steeper security
is more valuable.
Then, by assumption (2) we have that
|Ri(vi, S ′)−Ri(vi, S ′′)| ≥ |Rj(vj, S ′)−Rj(vj, S ′′)|
Therefore, the more risk averse buyers become relatively more aggressive at
the time to submit their bids. But then, it implies that the bid ranking for the
buyer with higher risk aversion cannot decrease when switching from S ′′ to S ′.
Corollary 22 Let S ′ be a family of securities steeper than S ′′. Then, the expected
revenue for the seller generated by any security of the family S ′ is at least as high
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as the expected revenue generated by any security of S ′′.
Proof. Let σ(n)(S) be the nth highest bid when the auction is run under security S.
Suppose that S ′ is steeper than S ′′, then by proposition 19 E(n)S ′(σ(n)(S ′), vn) >
E(n)S ′′(σ(n)(S ′′), vn) since all bidders become more aggressive because of higher
insurance. Furthermore, by proposition 21, V (1)(S ′) ≥ V (1)(S ′′). Therefore, by
assumption 2 and the sMLRP condition, we have that
ES ′(σ(2)(S ′), V (1)(S ′))− ES ′′(σ(2)(S ′′), V (1)(S ′′)) > 0
We turn to our second result: that call option is the only security that ex-ante
guarantees ex-post Pareto eﬃciency. In order to do so, we need to introduce ﬁrst
a notion of local steepness.
Deﬁnition 23 Let S be a security ﬂatter than call option. We say that S ′ is
an (, z∗)-steeper security of S if S ′(z, s) = (1 − )S(z, s) for all z ≤ z∗ and
S ′(z, s) = (1 + )S(z, s) for all z > z∗.
Notice that the only direction in which there might be an ex-post Pareto im-
provement in the auction is if the steepness of the security increases, since the
seller would extract more revenue and the bidders would beneﬁt from having more
insurance. The eﬀect for the seller is unambiguous. Nonetheless, for bidders it is
necessary to provide conditions such that the higher insurance more than oﬀsets,
the higher surplus extraction, conditional on the fact that the winner remains the
same.
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Proposition 24 For all securities S ﬂatter than call option, if θ is suﬃciently
large, there exists a (, z∗)-steeper security of S, called S ′, and constants δ1 and
δ2, such that if θ − θ < δ1, and v − v < δ2, S ′ ex-post Pareto dominates S.
Proof. Let w(S) be the identity of the winner under security S. Hence, by the
continuity of u(θ, ·) in θ, the continuity of h(z|v) in v, and by assumption 1, there
exists δ1 and δ2, such that if θ − θ < δ1, and v − v < δ2, w(S) = w(S ′) for some
(, z∗)-steeper security of S, S ′.
Now, we have to prove that the higher insurance provided to the winner, more
than oﬀsets the higher bid he has to pay under the steeper security. Indeed, if
bidders are suﬃciently risk averse (i.e. if the lower bound θ is suﬃciently large),
then we have that for all θ ∈ [θ, θ]
∫ y∗
0
u(θ, yS′)gS′dyS′ −
∫ y∗
0
u(θ, yS)gSdyS >
∫ y¯
y∗
u(θ, yS)gSdyS −
∫ y¯
y∗
u(θ, yS′)gS′dyS′
where y∗ corresponds to z∗ in the Y space.
Remarkably, if the environment is suﬃciently rich, the only security that guar-
antees ex-post Pareto eﬃciency is call option, which also happens to be the security
that delivers the highest revenue to the seller.
3.4 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we incorporate ex-ante heterogeneous risk averse bidders into the
model of DKS to analyse the implications of using steeper securities for eﬃciency
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and seller's revenue. We show that steeper securities provide higher insurance
to risk averse bidders because they induce payoﬀ distributions that dominate in
second order stochastic dominance the ones derived from ﬂatter securities. The
higher level of insurance levels the ﬁeld for risk averse bidders and allows them
to be more aggressive in their bids. This increase in the aggressiveness has two
eﬀects: (i) the signal of the winner under a steeper security is weakly higher, and
(ii) the expected revenue for the seller increases.
We also show that unlike standard auctions, the interest of the seller and the
bidders might be aligned if the seller utilizes a steeper security to run the auction.
The seller is better oﬀ because it is extracting a higher surplus, whereas bidders
beneﬁt from having higher insurance, provided they are suﬃciently alike and risk
averse. This alignment makes it possible to derive Pareto improvements for any
security ﬂatter than call option if the environment is suﬃciently rich. Therefore,
call option not only maximizes seller's expected revenue, but also increases classical
eﬃciency in the sense that the winner tends to have a higher signal. Moreover, it
is the only security that guarantees ex-post Pareto eﬃciency.
We present two applications to back up our results. The ﬁrst application comes
from a decision of the US government aﬀecting coal lease at the end of the 60s.
After deciding to stop providing an estimate of the mine value before the auction
the information across bidders became asymmetric, thus bidders with higher risk
aversion became less interested in the auction. Since royalty was a plausible scheme
to run the auction, we concluded that it would have been wiser to use it more often.
Afterwards, we analyse the 3G Hong Kong auction and argue that their decision
to conduct it on equity was the appropriate one.
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